


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
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THE LOGISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
THE US EXPERIENCE 1939-1949

THEBIS

William L. Scott, Capt, USAF

AFIT/GLM/LSC/908-51

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THE LOGISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
THE US EXPERIENCE 1939-1949

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

William L. Scott, B.A.
Captain, USAF

September 1990

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Preface

The purpose of this thesis was to develop logistics lessons learned from US Army Civil Affairs and Military Government (CA/MG) activities during World War II. These lessons could help to train logisticians to deal with CA/MG logistics issues in future contingencies.

This thesis is an historical analysis of events immediately prior to, during, and immediately after World War II. Source documents from the Army, especially its CA/MG branches, were used along with diaries and biographies of key military figures actively involved in CA/MG. In addition, secondary sources developed by historians were used. Popular articles of the day were also reviewed.

In researching and writing this thesis, I have received a great deal of help from others. I am deeply in debt to my thesis advisor, Jerome G. Peppers, Jr., for his continuing patience and assistance. I also wish to thank all the personnel in the Reference Section of the AFIT Library for their assistance in obtaining most of the reference material reviewed in this thesis. I also wish to thank John Schiefen for his friendship during our stay at AFIT. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Lu Anne, and my two sons, Nathan and Adam, for their understanding and patience over the past few months. May God bless all of you.

William L. Scott

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Abstract

Although the role of the logistician in civil affairs and military governments (CA/MG) is critical, little has been written on the logistical aspects of CA/MG. The importance of CA/MG logistics has been recognized in both the central European theater and in low intensity conflicts. However, military training does not ordinarily prepare the military logistician for CA/MG. Hence, an analysis of the largest US CA/MG effort (World War II) is an important step in preparing future logisticians to deal with such issues. This thesis examines the US logistics efforts under CA/MG during World War II and immediately following the war. It looks at our efforts in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. Logistics lessons learned from these efforts are developed and related to current CA/MG planning and training efforts.

THE LOGISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
THE US EXPERIENCE 1939-1949

I. Introduction

Overview

Although the role of the logistician in civil affairs and military governments (CA/MG) is critical, little has been written on the logistical aspects of CA/MG. The importance of CA/MG logistics has been recognized in both the central European theater and in low intensity conflicts. However, military training does not ordinarily prepare the military logistician for CA/MG. Hence, an analysis of the largest US CA/MG effort (World War II) is an important step in preparing future logisticians to deal with such issues. This thesis examines the US logistics efforts under CA/MG during World War II and immediately following the war. It looks at our efforts in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. Logistics lessons learned are developed and related to current CA/MG planning and training efforts.

Definitions

The following important terms are defined:

Civil Affairs (CA): Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the

military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area. As such, civil affairs would exclude military governments. This is not the case now. Since World War II the concept of civil affairs has expanded to encompass military governments as a subset of civil affairs. For a discussion of the US history of civil affairs and military government see Chapter II.

Civil Affairs and Military Government Logistics: A system that creates and sustains the economic capabilities of a liberated or occupied country. CA/MG logistics includes the care and feeding of the civilian population, distribution and supply of reconstruction materials, restoration of public utilities, etc. (37:57)

Military Government (MG): The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory (JCS,97).

Liberated Territory: Friendly territory freed from rule of hostile forces.

Occupied Territory: Enemy territory conquered and under control of allied forces.

Background

In spite of an American tradition against the military exercise of civil power, military governments, or at least the performance of CA/MG functions by the US military, have

existed in every major war since the War with Mexico. Because of its historical experiences the US began early to develop a negative attitude toward military occupation or involvement in civil government activities (43:1). The oppression of the colonists under British rule and the Indian Wars where occupation was irrelevant to "savages" who had no rights to sovereignty and were not considered to be conquered nations helped develop this negative attitude.

More general ideological concerns about military governments have also been raised. Some writers, such as then Secretary of the Interior Ickes, see the authoritarian nature of military organizations as incompatible with establishing democratic institutions in occupied lands (43:17). President Roosevelt was also wary of "ruling by the sword," and being accused of imperialism at a time we were fighting to preserve democracy (15:26). Writers, such as Hanson W. Baldwin, also see the "military mind" with its emphasis on command, tangible products, and preference for physical power over political power as incompatible with developing democratic institutions (43:17).

The result of these early negative experiences and ideological concerns is a nation familiar with warfare, but unfamiliar with the problems of occupation. For example, after World War I, the US Army was to govern the Rhineland. However, military men trained in combat operations were called on to govern this territory with no training or

guidance on how they were to proceed (15:6). In fact there was no Army Field Manual for Military Government until 1940. We have historically disregarded the difficulties of occupation rather than prepare for them (43:2).

Notwithstanding these early negative experiences and ideological objections to military governments, there are four major reasons why the US has relied on military forms of control. First, all writers recognize the military commander's authority on all matters in a combat theater must be paramount during war (15:5,30). The US Army's experience in French North Africa illustrates the value of this principle. Prior to Operation TORCH, the decision was made to keep the existing French Vichy government in power after the US invasion. The State Department provided manpower to act as liaison between the Vichy government and the US Army. The State Department also handled all economic issues under the Lend-Lease program. This divided control in a combat theater never worked well. Coordination between civilian agencies and the military was a problem throughout the campaign. For a detailed examination of the US experience in French North Africa see Chapter III.

This principle of undivided control has led to a theater commander controlling the civilian population through a purely military administration while the prospect of military action exists (15:31). The military administration is usually in the form of a specialized group

of CA/MG technicians. This avoids an unacceptable drain on combat forces and turns CA/MG into a force multiplier. The value of effective CA/MG operations as a force multiplier was dramatically illustrated at the start of World War II. The German's rapid invasion of France created a large refugee problem. The French army was ineffective in controlling the movements of these refugees. As a result, the flood of refugees clogged the highways and inhibited the movement of French troops.

Second, immediately following combat it is imperative that local government functions, such as law and order, be restored quickly (43:17-18). However, the safety of incoming civilian CA/MG technicians cannot be guaranteed immediately after liberation or occupation of territory. So the logical step has been to create an interim military government.

Third, the need for civilian and military supplies has led to the adoption of military control over all logistics issues. International law requires that an occupying force take all reasonable measures to ensure the health, safety, and well being of the civilian population (43:6). At the same time there is usually a number of military forces stationed in the area and their supply remains the responsibility of the Army. So, it is usually deemed appropriate for the Army to supply civilian needs to avoid duplication of logistic resources. For example, rather than

have one port for civilian relief supplies and another for military supplies, with each run by their respective port clearing agencies, it is more efficient to have one organization run all port operations. Since the military must have port operations regardless of CA/MG needs, the role of supplying all logistics needs has fallen on the military. Because logistical issues are a large part of CA/MG operations, military control was extended to all areas of CA/MG as a matter of administrative convenience.

Fourth, the desire to maintain continuity in governing the occupied region has led to a continuation of military control after hostilities cease. Thus, military control usually continues until the indigenous population can assume control over its own governmental affairs.

The CA/MG mission calls for military, political, and economic activities. Much has been written on the appropriateness of military governments and the political goals they are to achieve. However, consensus on these goals has been hard to achieve. World War II brought to the fore the clash of competing ideologies in defining the role of CA/MG. For example, should the US force its version of democracy on the rest of the world, should it encourage other forms of democracy, or should it punish the aggressors for their hostile acts? During World War II, the US seemed to pursue all three of these conflicting goals simultaneously (43:26). The implications of this

inconsistent policy on CA/MG will not be addressed in this thesis except as it impacts on logistical issues. However, the failure to identify clear policies are at the heart of many CA/MG failures (43:24).

The role of the logistician in CA/MG is critical but little has been written on the logistics of CA/MG. Moreover, the importance of CA/MG logistics has been recognized in both the central European theater and in low intensity conflicts (5:40; 17:61). For example, the transportation requirements for our military forces during a European conflict translate into an 800 ship fleet, but 1500 ships are required to meet anticipated US support for the civil populations (both in the rear area and in the combat zone) of a war-torn Europe (42:22). It has also been estimated that up to 36 million civilians would be caught in any forward combat zone during a war in central Europe (41:73). Control of these civilians would fall under the authority of the theater commander. In spite of the enormity of the problems facing the CA/MG function generally, and logistics specifically, NATO is considered weak in the area of CA/MG planning and operations (41:76). CA/MG lessons learned from World War II need to be identified and applied to current CA/MG planning especially in the European theater.

Military training does not ordinarily prepare the military logistician for CA/MG. Hence, an in-depth analysis

of the largest CA/MG effort (World War II) is an important step in preparing future logisticians to deal with such issues. Writers have noted that NATO, when fighting in central Europe, would face the same CA/MG problems that faced commanders during World War II, but they would be magnified (34:15). In particular, the effect of the indigenous population on military operations and movements should not be underestimated. This thesis addresses the US logistics efforts under CA/MG during World War II and the post war occupation of Germany. Lessons learned from these logistics efforts are presented and applied to current CA/MG planning and training efforts.

Research Problem

What lessons can be learned about CA/MG logistics issues from World War II and applied to the current training of CA/MG personnel?

Investigative Questions

The following investigative questions were examined to address the research problem.

1. What was the planning for CA/MG prior to and during World War II? Were the plans followed and were they effective?
2. What CA/MG logistics lessons were learned in the liberation of North Africa? Were these lessons applied

during the rest of the war and during the post-war occupation of Germany?

3. What CA/MB logistics lessons were learned in the occupation of Italy? Were they applied during the post-war occupation of Germany?
4. What CA/MB logistics lessons were learned in the liberation of Europe? Were they applied during the post-war occupation of Germany?
5. What CA/MB logistics lessons were learned during the initial occupation of Germany (1945-1949)?

Methodology

This thesis is an historical analysis of events immediately prior to, during, and immediately after World War II. Source documents from the Army, especially its CA/MB branches, were used along with diaries and biographies of key military figures actively involved in CA/MB. In addition, secondary sources developed by historians were used. Popular articles of the day were also reviewed.

The historical approach has been defined as "past oriented research which seeks to illuminate a question of current interest by an intensive study of materials that already exist" (27:406). Or stated another way, it searches for causes, explanations, and interpretations as much as for facts or data (27:411). There are three major steps in the historical method (33:179-80). The first is collecting

data. The second is criticizing the data both internally and externally. Finally, presenting the facts in a readable, organized fashion.

There are two major types of historical data. The first is data from primary sources. Primary sources are the only solid basis of historical work and include original documents or remains and the first witnesses to a fact (33:184). All other sources are classed as secondary and are at least two steps removed from the event or fact (20:135; 27:414). However, even the use of primary data is not without problems.

There are two major problems in performing historical research (27:407-9). The first is the lack of control the researcher has over the data. That is, the researcher has no ability to generate new data, alter the form of existing data, or to ask clarifying questions. The second problem is existing data may not be a representative of the data available during the event. The data itself may also be biased. Biased data is particularly of concern with information deliberately recorded about a certain event. The purposes of the author for recording data can only be surmised and deliberate data is usually considered to be subjective in nature.

To ameliorate these data problems the researcher engages in external and internal criticisms of the available data (33:188). External criticism is concerned with the

genuineness and authenticity of the data. The purpose of external criticism is to question the authorship of the document by checking the qualifications of the author, determining when it was written relative to when the event took place, and how it was written (i.e., from memory, in consultation with others, etc.). External criticism also determines the conditions that influenced the writing of the document such as the time, place, purpose, and circumstances of the composition (33:189-90). Internal criticism deals with meaning and trustworthiness or accuracy and value of the statements within a document. The purpose here is to look at the statements within the document for the competence, good faith, position, and bias of the author. The goal being to discover the literal and real meaning of the text while critically questioning the good faith and accuracy of the author (33:198).

It is through this process of criticism that the researcher arrives at historical facts. As one author has put it:

to consider a piece of historical data as fact we must have three elements: (1) corroboration from two independent sources, (2) one independent source a primary source; and (3) we must have no reputable sources who hold contradictory views of events. (27:415-6)

The third step in the historical method is to present historical facts in a readable fashion (27:416). Here there are three steps. The first is the descriptive phase. This

involves the presentation of facts in an orderly fashion. Next comes the interpretive phase. Here the researcher analyzes the data and reaches conclusions. The final phase is to apply the data to contemporary problems and develop hypotheses for future research (33:174).

Scope and Limitations

The time constraints of the graduate education program made it impractical to review all evidence concerning US Army CA/MG and military government operations from 1939-1949. The research was limited, in particular, in its use of primary information sources. The Pacific theater was also excluded because of time limitations.

Outline of Thesis

This chapter has provided some background to the specific research problem. It has presented the investigative questions used in analyzing the research problem. It has also presented a discussion of the historical approach used in this thesis and provided a description of the general scope and limitations of this thesis. The next chapter will discuss the events leading to the US Army assuming the role of governing liberated and occupied territories during World War II. It will also discuss the planning to carry out the Army's civil affairs and military government roles. The third chapter will describe the CA/MG efforts in the Mediterranean theater starting with North

Africa, then the liberation of Sicily, Italy, and Southern France. The fourth chapter will describe the CA/MG efforts in the European theater. Specific attention will be paid to the liberation of France, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The governing of Germany during the war years will also be discussed. The fifth chapter deals with the post-war occupation of Germany. The sixth and final chapter analyzes the data presented in the previous chapters, answers the investigative questions posed in Chapter I, and offers recommendations for further research.

II. US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government Preparations

Pre-World War II Experiences in Civil Affairs/Military Government

The US had many experiences with military governments or military occupations before World War II (2:18-9). According to Merle Fainsod, "In every major war since the War of 1812 the armed forces of the United States had found it necessary to establish controls over civilian populations in occupied territories" (24:23). During these occupations, rarely was US military government policy explicit. Rather it was implicit in the actions of the military governors. The lack of a national policy for military occupation also plagued the US in World War II.

US actions during these occupations were bound by international law and conventions, such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These conventions were based on the notion of "civilized war," and not the "total war" of World War II. The traditional view of "civilized war" saw military occupation operating within legal constraints and not unduly interfering with the existing legal, political, and economic institutions of the occupied land.

This was in contrast to the modern view, developed during World War II, which saw war as a moral crusade against Fascism and Nazism. The social, legal, and political regimes of Fascism and Nazism were to be destroyed

and replaced with democratic institutions. To accomplish this task, the occupation force would assume control of government affairs down to the local level. An unprecedented number of US personnel were involved in the running of another country, while implementing an extensive program of social and civic reform. These reform efforts were complicated by the fact that a moral war based on unconditional surrender required the enemy to be totally defeated (including massive attacks on civilian populations), and then severely punished for their actions. It was the tension between the opposite goals of reforming German society and destroying/punishing it that caused much of the policy confusion during the initial occupation of Germany.

The conflict between the traditional view of military government and the modern one also led to many of the policy problems of CA/MB during World War II. To fully understand these differences and appreciate how they affected the logistical aspects of CA/MB a brief history of US occupations prior to World War II is presented.

War with Mexico. One of the first directives relating to military governments was issued during the Mexican War. In 1846, Secretary of War William L. Marcy directed Colonel Stephen Kearny to seize the Mexican province of New Mexico, and set up a military government preparatory to the US

annexing the territory (28:419). Colonel Kearny's military government was to be temporary until New Mexico could elect its own territorial representatives. All existing officials were retained if they would take an oath of allegiance to the US. After the collapse of the Mexican government in New Mexico, Colonel Kearny appointed a civilian governor and lower governmental officials to perform the tasks of local government under the direction of the military governor. Ultimately, the idea of a civil governor was dropped and Kearny took the title of both civil and military governor. This experiment of dual civilian and military control was repeated in North African during World War II with a similar lack of success.

In addition, General Winfield Scott was ordered in 1848 to seize Mexico City. The purpose of this occupation was twofold: (1) to force Mexico to pay large sums of money to defray the costs of the war, and (2) to maintain US influence over Mexico until a peace treaty was successfully negotiated. In neither case was the goal the total destruction of the Mexican government or the replacement of that government with more democratic institutions. It was a war of conquest and not a moral war.

The Mexican War was the first major military occupation by the US (43:1). As such, it is instructive to examine how the US faced the issue of occupation policy. One of the

first lessons learned from the Mexican War was the difficulty of establishing good working relationships between the officials who formulate occupation policy and the combat forces which execute them.

General Zachary Taylor was the first US commander in Mexico. He permitted his subordinates to deal with the Mexicans as they saw fit. The result was numerous cases of alleged atrocities (robbery, murder, and rape), and a national scandal (43:50). Subsequently, General Taylor was replaced by General Scott.

At this point President Polk and the Congress tried to step in and create an overall occupation policy to guide General Scott in his efforts to reach Mexico City. The best that Congress could do was to direct Scott to deal with the Mexicans following the "Law of Nations." By the Law of Nations, Congress meant the military could do what ever it wanted within the fundamental moral restraints of civilized nations. Faced with this vague guidance General Scott issued General Order 20 and other directives that established the policy the Army would follow towards Mexico during the occupation.

In order to reach Mexico City, General Scott would be dependent on the Mexicans living along his supply route. His occupation policy was designed to persuade the Mexicans to cooperate with or at least not interfere with his

military actions. To achieve this objective, General Scott distinguished between the citizens of an enemy state and the officials of that state. Scott ordered his troops to respect the Mexican's peaceful customs, traditions, and institutions. The US troops were to be seen as enemies of the Mexican government, but friends of the Mexican people. He also established a well defined set of regulations to govern the relationships between the occupying force and the Mexicans. General Scott placed both his troops and the Mexicans under the same legal and moral sanctions. In this manner General Scott established an occupation policy which furthered his military objectives. This lesson that the tactical commander's role in military government is to insure the military success of his mission through occupation policies which inhibit civilians from impeding the course of the war carried over to World War II.

Civil War. During the Civil War, Union troops occupied many confederate territories including New Orleans (from 1862 to 1865), Vicksburg, and Memphis. The objectives were to deny the Confederacy access to the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi River, and restore these areas to the Union. The Military Government (MG) activities included maintaining law and order, feeding population, and regulating the economy (16:22). The Union officers faced with these tasks were untrained for the mission, received no coherent

guidance, and were frequently rotated from the field to a position in the military government.

There was a moral aspect to the Civil War. In fact, President Roosevelt frequently cited General Grant's demand for unconditional surrender as precedence for his call for unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in World War II. The moral character of the war - eliminating slavery- suggested the South be treated with restraint during the occupation. But the lack of clear occupation policies developed prior to the Civil War meant the mood of the moment often dominated occupation policies. Unfortunately, the mood was generally one of punitive response. Besides this policy vacuum, there was no central authority on occupation matters. Consequently, each commander governed his territory as he saw fit. This decentralized approach meant a wide spectrum of policies were developed to deal with the South.

General Ben Butler's harsh and punitive treatment of New Orleans highlighted one end of the spectrum (43:111-3). Unfortunately, the result of General Butler's actions were to widen the rift between North and South and had repercussions on the conduct of the rest of the Civil War. For example, General Butler's associates cheated the merchants of New Orleans and he personally insulted the honor of southern women by accusing them of aiding and

abetting criminals - a serious breach of honor in the South. Conditions reached the point where the South placed a price on his head - dead or alive.

This decentralized approach to military occupation continued after the war (43:113-4). The South was divided into five military districts each headed by a Major General. Once again each commander received little guidance from the federal government. Some ruled with policies of moderation and reconstruction, while others were punitive and exploitative. Scandals were common place. This "Rule of the Major Generals" was the outgrowth of a moral war fought without the federal government establishing the principles of national interest that should guide the occupation. A lesson the US was slow to learn during World War II.

Spanish-American War. The Spanish-American War was the next time the US faced the task of military occupation. The US occupied the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Panama, and Cuba following the Spanish-American War. The US experience in occupying Cuba is illustrative of US efforts after the war, and is the focus of this review.

There were several US goals in occupying Cuba. One of the goals was to instruct the Cubans in the art of self-government. The other was to bring a minimum level of public sanitation/health to the island. Again the military was ill-equipped for the task it faced. According to one

author Cuba was governed so ineptly that establishment of a communist regime in Cuba was almost inevitable (43:2).

In Cuba the military governor, General John R. Brooke, was aided and advised by Cuban secretaries. Each of the separate provinces were also under control of a General. For the most part the old Spanish law was kept and updated to reflect separation from Spanish control. Courts were reorganized and reform attempted. This reform met with partial success. The judges were put on salary and a jury systems was introduced. The jury system failed because of wide spread illiteracy, exclusion of professionals from jury duty, and a deeply embedded Spanish dislike of passing judgement on fellow citizens. The jury system had to be replaced with tribunals.

This US mood of preparing Cuba for democracy and possible annexation was soon replaced by a mood of disdain for the Cubans. The Army commanders and troops were not prepared for the ethnic and social differences they experienced in Cuba. A large number of the islanders were classed as "inferior" negroes. The Cuban guerrillas were undisciplined and refused to take orders from the Americans. The Cubans stole US Army equipment and personal property. As the US disdain for the Cubans grew, the commanders increasingly used the Cuban troops for menial labor. This downward spiral in relations between the Cubans and the

Americans continued. The Cuban armed troops retreated into the hills and there were open insurrections by the Cubans. The cost of the occupation also began to rise. The Cuban postal scandal of 1900 sealed the fate of Cuba. Ready or not, self-rule was granted to Cuba in 1902.

The Cuban postal scandal of 1900 illustrates the problem of dual civilian-military control and the havoc such dual control can play on CA/MB logistics. The Cuban postal administration was put under the control of the Postmaster General. The Director General of Posts in Havana was virtually independent of the military governor. This independence made it difficult for the governor to audit and supervise the finances of the post office. However, in January 1900 the War Department discovered numerous irregularities in the post office accounts. This led Secretary of War Elihu Root to direct General Wood, Governor of Cuba, to insure accurate financial reports were sent. The result of this Army investigation was the absconding by a high ranking official and public outcries over the scandal. Root and Wood proceeded to clean up the post office. However, General Wood was nearly relieved of command though he was not directly responsible for the post office.

In spite of numerous setbacks and the general failure of US occupation policy in Cuba, there were some successes.

Between 1898-1902 the US helped to rebuild Cuba's war-torn economy, develop a communications system, start public health and sanitation programs, and promote an expansion of the education system (47:177).

The initial task for the US was to establish internal order. Cuba's long struggle for independence from Spain had left it with several thousand heavily armed Cubans. In exchange for \$3 million in bonuses General Mazimo Gomez agreed to disband his revolutionary army. A rural guard was set up in its place.

When the US left in 1902, a Cuban government was elected and the US assumed that Cuba with its abundant natural resources and training in self-government was on its way to being a stable, responsible state. This was not the case. The government was not strong enough to resist veterans' pressures for additional bonuses and granted them additional benefits and political favors. In 1906 revolution occurred and the government requested US assistance.

Under the second occupation the US strengthened the Cuban army and put it on a professional footing. The US left in 1909. Succeeding governments used the military to maintain power. By 1925 Cuba was ruled by military dictatorship. The US, through its reluctance to consider

logistical/economic aspects of CA/MB and its lack of staying power, failed to develop democratic institutions in Cuba.

Haiti. Haiti also suffered under military dictatorships prior to US intervention in 1915 (47:179-81). Political instability had led Haiti to bankruptcy and Germany and France were threatening intervention. The US intervened instead. The goals of the occupation were to preserve Haitian independence, protect US property, and establish a stable, responsible government. To accomplish this the US imposed a new constitution, reorganized finances, started public health and public works projects, and tried to reduce the opportunities for graft. The army was also reorganized into a constabulary force confined to maintaining order. The constabulary force was composed of Negroes. When the US left in 1934, tensions between the Negro constabulary and the mulatto government increased. The mulatto government gradually undid the economic and political reforms of the occupation era. Eventually, the constabulary force stepped in, and by 1950 it was in full control. The US in imposing reforms, had failed to involve the local population and failed to take into account the divergent interest groups in Haiti.

The Dominican Republic. Like Haiti the Dominican Republic suffered under a rapid succession of military dictators prior to US occupation in 1916 (47:181-2). Like

Haiti internal order was established, and public health and public works projects were undertaken. As in Haiti, the military was seen as the key to political stability and economic progress of the country. A professional army was established. In 1924 the US left and General Horacio Vasquez was elected President. Six years later he altered the constitution to allow himself to continue his rule. General Trujillo, who was in charge of the Army, allowed the constitutional change to go through, ran for the presidency and remained the president until his assassination in 1961.

Nicaragua. Between 1909 and 1925 US backed rulers ran Nicaragua (47:185-6). In 1925, when the US withdrew its small Marine presence, unrest broke out. In 1926 2,000 US Marines landed to restore order. Warring Nicaraguan factions agreed to turn in their arms and free elections were held under US supervision in 1928 and 1932. As in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, a strong professional army was seen as the key to a stable government. Once the US departed in 1933, the Guardia Nacional, which had been built to insure honest orderly government, began to assume control. In 1936 General Somoza took complete control of the government. Once again the US had placed its emphasis on restoring order at the expense of developing the necessary logistical/economic infrastructure to insure

lasting democratic institutions. As a result, it failed to achieve the stable, responsible government that was the occupation's goal.

World War I. The next instance of US military occupation occurred after World War I with the occupation of the Rhineland. Here the occupying forces were ordered to enforce the terms of the armistice, maintain order, and be prepared to resume fighting on a moment's notice. During this occupation the US used tactical forces in the military government. This CA/MG role was incidental to the primary duties of a commander. Use of tactical forces was based on two factors. First, the possibility that hostilities might resume meant tactical forces were still required. Second, the US found itself unprepared to assume responsibilities for governing the Rhineland, and it had to improvise an organizational structure. As Colonel Irwin Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, has noted "the American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty" (15:6-7).

The US experience in the Rhineland was the primary basis for the first Army Field Manual dealing with CA/MG issued in 1940. As such, it was not based on the premise of total war. President Wilson's policy for dealing with the

Rhineland was one of maintaining the status quo. The belief was that Europe was saved intact after World War I, and the Continental powers of Europe would rise again and insure peace and stability around the world. As a result, only minimal restraints were placed on the German people during the occupation. The belief was that a nonpunitive occupation would speed the development of a stable and democratic Germany. Unfortunately, the other occupation forces, particularly France and Britain, did not subscribe to President Wilson's policy. The punitive measures of the Treaty of Versailles were a major contributor to the rise of Nazi Germany and the start of World War II.

Eastern Siberia. From the summer of 1918 to the Spring of 1920 the US participated in the joint occupation of eastern Siberia (28:421-5). Japan, France, and Great Britain participated with the US in this occupation. The purposes of the occupation were to assist a Czech force that had escaped from the German army and was making its way across Siberia, to help Russia achieve self-government, and to guard Allied military stores. President Wilson expressly ordered General Graves, the US occupation commander, not to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. Because eastern Siberia was far from US interests, General Graves was largely left free to interpret this directive and determine questions of political policy. General Graves

scrupulously remained neutral even when it meant hurting Allied actions against the Bolsheviks in northern Russia. As a result, he never set up a military government. He merely policed certain areas of eastern Siberia and kept them free from foreign domination including Japanese attempts in Siberia. Again, CA/MB logistical issues were not a major consideration during the occupation.

Dalamatia. After the Armistice of November, 1918 the US occupied the Dalamatia coast of what is now Yugoslavia (28:427-30). With the defeat of Austria in World War I the territory that is now Yugoslavia was up for grabs. The Yugoslavians were attempting to set up national and regional governments but the Dalamatia coast was also coveted by the Italians because of its valuable coal and bauxite deposits, and its strategic position on the Adriatic Sea. The occupation of Dalamatia was strictly a naval affair. The US Navy was to disarm and guard certain Austrian warships in the area, maintain order, and aid the Yugoslavians in developing their own nation.

The US did not impose any military government structure on the area. It merely acted as a buffer between the Italians and the Yugoslavians. Once, the Italians and the Yugoslavians negotiated a settlement in 1921 the US withdrew.

World War II Planning Phase

Planning for CA/MG during World War II took place at three distinct levels: national level, War Department level, and theater level. Planning did not logically precede from the national level, to the War Department, and then to the theater implementation of these national objectives. Rather the planning was haphazard, and occurred simultaneously at all three levels. As a result, there was much confusion and duplication of effort. This failure to identify national interest objectives at the outset of the war was at the root of the planning problem.

National Planning for Civil Affairs/Military Government. National planning for CA/MG had two main focus. The first centered on the question of what US policy for CA/MG should be. The second concerned what organization - civilian or military - could best carry out these objectives.

National Interest Objectives. As Clausewitz has noted, war is the continuation of politics by other means (36:6). War should be conducted to some well defined end and that end is the desired political objective. During World War II the objective was the total defeat and elimination of the German and Japanese military threats. Broadly stated, the US war effort was one of assuring US security. President Roosevelt also saw World War II as a

moral war against Fascism and Nazism. He wanted to rid the world of the influences of Fascism and Nazism and replace them with democratic institutions. This emphasis on defeating our enemies lead to the supremacy of military objectives over political objectives. We had no long-term plan for how the world would look after the war. This failure to tie our war effort to long-term national security objectives led to a break-down in CA/MG planning.

At a national level CA/MG planing was preoccupied with the German question: that is what to do with Germany to insure it never again posed a military threat. Little attention was given to reconstructing a war torn Europe, the economic role Germany would play in a postwar Europe, or what would be the US and Soviet roles in the postwar era. Not surprisingly, the US was dismayed when after the war it discovered that France and Britain were incapable of solving their internal reconstruction problems without outside aid. Britain and France were also unable to assume their prewar role as world powers. US planning for CA/MG did not foresee these events nor did it foresee the rise of the Soviet Union as a world power and its domination of eastern Europe.

Because the US did not foresee the liberated countries of Europe needing outside aid for reconstruction, CA/MG planning efforts at the national level were basically ones of negotiating reverse Lend-Lease agreements and developing

liaison organizations with the liberated governments. The goal was to turn over responsibility for the liberated country to the local governments as soon as hostilities permitted. Little thought was given to assisting liberated territories in recovering from the effects of the war. See Chapter IV for a discuss of Civil Affairs agreements with the liberated countries of Europe.

Roosevelt announced the Allies policy of unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers during the Casablanca Conference (18-24 January 1943). Exactly what this phrase meant was unclear. But, what was clear was that it represented a dramatic departure from the classical concept of war. Prior to the call for unconditional surrender, European wars had centered around the notion of negotiated settlement between the victor and the vanquished (3:15). For Roosevelt, unconditional surrender captured the essence of World War II. Roosevelt saw World War II as a moral war against Fascism and Nazism with total victory as the only possible acceptable result (3:16-7). The objective of the war was the total destruction of the military power of the Axis powers. As a moral war, punishment of war criminals was given high priority. In addition, a moral war meant the enemy people must be reeducated and be taught a lesson. Behind these objectives lay three assumptions by Roosevelt about the root causes of World War II (3:20). Roosevelt

believed the major cause of World War II was the dominance of militarism in Germany and Japan. He further believed that Germany was traditionally the aggressor in European wars. And finally, he believed that Prussia was at the core of German militarism. It was these attitudes that led to the emphasis on demilitarizing Germany and weakening its industrial capacity so that it could never again rise up to threaten the peace of the world. The view that Prussia was at the root of German militarism led to the dismemberment of Prussia, and led the US to accede to Soviet demands for the Eastern Prussian and Silesian regions of Prussia.

As will be seen later, the impact of these decision on logistics were tremendous. For example, the desire to reduce Germany's industrial capacity meant it could not export enough goods to meet its import requirements. However, the loss of its agricultural belt (Silesia) meant Germany needed to increase food imports (38:387,392). The loss of territory and subsequent forced removal of Germans exacerbated these problems as refugees flooded into Germany.

At the first Quebec Conference, Secretary of State Hull discussed the German question with British Foreign Secretary Eden (3:63). No decision was made, but the general tenor of the discussions centered around weakening Germany both politically and militarily through decentralization. Military occupation would apply during the transition to a

decentralized nation. In October 1943, Secretary of State Byrnes met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Eden to discuss, among other things, the future of Germany (3:64-5). Their discussions centered around disarmament, reparations, denazification, dismantling the German war machine, and decentralization. They were unable to reach any agreements, and the matter was referred to the European Advisory Commission (EAC), which they created at that time. The EAC also had trouble in reaching an agreement.

Meanwhile planning for the invasion of the Continent was going forward. One of the issues that needed to be address was occupation policy for Germany. Lacking any guidance, military planners at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) went ahead with their own planning efforts. A draft of these plans came into the hands of Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau. Morgenthau's violent objections to the Army plan led to his involvement in the planning for Germany and the so-called Morgenthau Plan. See Chapter V for a discussion of this punitive plan for postwar Germany.

This lack of positive logistical planning led to the adoption of the negative occupation goals of collecting war reparations from Germany, dismantling its military forces, and denazifying German society. Logistical planning, such as the Morgenthau Plan, was aimed at dismantling Germany's

industrial base and turning Germany into an agrarian society. No positive CA/MB logistical planning was evident at a national level. Efforts by the War Department to include such steps were rebuffed by the President.

Civilian-Military Debate. According to Lt Colonel Hanlon, "prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, no less than 13 governmental agencies were formulating policy for the administration of defeated nations" (35:4-5). These agencies included cabinet level organizations such as the Departments of State, War, Navy, and Agriculture. It also included such New Deal organizations as the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Production Board, and the National Research Council. With so many agencies involved the question of coordinating all these efforts arose. This coordination issue, in turn, revolved around the question of civilian versus military control of CA/MB activities.

The formation by the Department of War of a school in April 1942 to train CA/MB personnel intensified the debate. The course of this debate was to greatly influence the perceived role of CA/MB and have an enormous impact on logistical aspects of CA/MB.

The War Department's position was that the occupation of foreign territory could be divided into two phases. The first phase was one of military necessity. Here military matters would be paramount. This meant the Army would be

obligated to set up and maintain a military government during this phase. Once military necessity no longer existed the second phase of the occupation would begin. During the second phase a civilian authority could supplant the military.

The civilian agencies reluctant to have the military take the lead in any occupation were led by Secretary of Interior Ickes. Ickes felt the military was not the best agency to spread Democracy around the world. In addition, civilian agencies already existed which could provide relief supplies to civilians. These agencies included the Office of Lend-Lease, and the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. Another concern was that some of the functions of a civil government such as public administration were beyond the scope and training of military officers.

President Roosevelt was never comfortable with the idea of military government. As late as March 1943 he delegated responsibility for civilian relief to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. In addition, the Office of Lend-Lease and Board of Economic Warfare had some responsibility for economic planning in occupied territories.

Ultimately, the debate was resolved on practical terms. As the Bureau of the Budget noted to Roosevelt in March

1943, the civilians agencies had no integrated plan for CA/MB (15:65-6). The result was duplication of efforts and no over-riding organization that could effectively coordinate the efforts of the various civilian agencies. Meanwhile, the US experience in North Africa was demonstrating the validity of this assessment. In the end, the civilian agencies had neither the organization nor the manpower to take on the CA/MB function. Consequently, it fell by default to the Army. On 10 November 1943, the President gave the Army full responsibility for CA/MB efforts until the civilian agencies were able to take over the function (65:22). Until 1949, the US Army was in complete charge of CA/MB matters.

War Department Planning. The War Department started occupational planning for Japan and Germany in 1939 - two years before US entry into the war (35:4). War Department Basic Field Manual, Military Government (FM 27-5), was first published in 1940 (15:7). This Field Manual was the outgrowth of a study prepared by a student committee at the Army War College in 1939.

Under FM 27-5, the Personnel Division (G-1) of the War Department General Staff would be responsible for planning for and determining the policies of administering a military government. G-1 would also plan for and supervise the training of personnel needed for the military government

mission. The theater G-1 staff would develop the detailed CA/MG plans and train CA/MG officers for that theater of operation.

Planning and training activities included such areas as: public works and utilities, fiscal policy, public health, education, public safety, legal, communications, public welfare, and economics. Except for legal and some aspects of public welfare these areas are aspects of CA/MG logistics.

In 1941 pressure to start training personnel for CA/MG grew. This pressure came from two directions. The first was from Great Britain. Great Britain, as a colonial power, was long involved in military occupations and was already training officers for reconstruction and other postwar missions. The US Military Attache in London also recommended the US take preliminary steps to select and train officers for similar postwar duties. The second direction came from the Provost Marshal.

In September 1941, three months before US entry in the war, the Provost Marshal General Office (PMGO) proposed the US Army start training US personnel for a military government mission (9:949). In April 1942, the War Department gave its approval for the school.

The School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The school

would have 12 officer and civilian instructors, 25 other civilians and 1 enlisted man (65:8). The school could handle up to 100 students per class, and each class was scheduled to run 4 months.

The school experienced several problems. The most important were the quality of students, and the lack of capacity to train the required number of CA/MG officers. Operational commanders were reluctant to send their top officers to the school. Consequently, the school tried to get permission to recruit students directly, both from the military and the civilian worlds (65:9). In November 1942, the School received permission to commission 2,500 specialist directly from civilian life. The next problem was recruiting these civilians. To aid in this recruitment, the Army formed a committee headed by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman. This committee was to select qualified civilians.

In September 1942, the school estimated it would now take 6,00 CA/MG officers worldwide. However, the school could only graduate 450 students per year. Consequently, the school asked permission to establish another school at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia to train 1,200 junior officers each year (65:18). This proposal drew a lot of political criticism, and the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) was instituted instead. CATP would send recruits to Fort

Custer for one month to receive basic military training. The recruits would then go to one of 36 universities to receive technical training in CA/MB matters.

With the invasion of Sicily in 1943, the demand for CA/MB officers increased dramatically. The School was not able to meet this demand at first. However, in the fourth quarter of 1943 the school turned out more than 2,000 graduates. This erased the backlog in CA/MB officers. Consequently, recruitment for European training ended in December 1943, and the last class was completed in April 1944.

Theater Planning. CA/MB planning efforts for the Mediterranean theater are covered in Chapter III, planning efforts for European theater are covered in Chapter IV, and planning efforts for Germany are covered in Chapter V.

III. US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government: Mediterranean Theater

North Africa Campaign

Prelude to Operation TORCH. In early 1942 the Operations Plans Division (OPD) of the War Department developed the basic US military strategy for defeating Germany. This involved a cross-Channel attack on German forces from England. It was felt military forces could best be concentrated in England for the main attack against the Axis powers. The Mediterranean route was rejected because of its greater distance from the US, the disadvantage of attacking Germany over the Alps, and the inability to concentrate sufficient forces in the Mediterranean. The problem with a cross-Channel invasion was that it would take time to concentrate forces. The earliest time for a cross-Channel invasion was Spring 1943.

The success of the cross-Channel invasion was also predicated on a strong eastern front absorbing a large number of German troops. In 1942 it was not clear Russia would last that long. In addition, Stalin was pressing Roosevelt and Churchill to engage the Germans now. Consequently, in July 1942, the Allies decided on Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa. This invasion would quickly aid the Russians, it would also provide a means of getting US troops in combat quickly, and

it would allow the Allies to tap the military potential of the French colonies (30:3-4; 39:10-11).

The Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa occurred on 8 Nov 1942, less than four months after the invasion decision. General Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander of the expeditionary forces and Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) was established.

The initial objective was to establish beach heads along the Oran-Algiers-Tunis coast and in the Casablanca area. From there the Allies would extend control over all of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. From this position the Allies could attack German forces in Egypt from the rear through Libya (39:16).

After some initial disagreements between the English and the Americans on where to land in North Africa, a compromise was reached. There were three task forces. The first was the Western Task Force, composed of US troops shipped from the US. It landed at Casablanca. These troops were led by General George Patton. The second was the Center Task Force, composed of US troops shipped from England. It landed in the Mediterranean at Oran. These troops were led by General Lloyd Fredendall. The third was the Eastern task force, composed of both US and British troops. It landed in Algiers. Once in Algiers, the third task force, led by General Charles Ryder, would turn east

and head for Tunisia. The objective was to secure Tunisia before the Axis powers did. However, the Axis beat the Allies to Tunisia, and the battle for Tunisia was on (60:225-26).

The most important limitation in planning the invasion was transportation. Shipping was critical during this stage of the war, and an invasion of French North Africa meant long seas lanes either from the US or Great Britain. The major bottleneck was the convoy size that could be safely escorted. For slow moving ships, the convoy limit was 45 for ships from the US and 35 for ships from Great Britain (45:436). Starting in the spring of 1943 these restrictions were eased and the situation improved somewhat. In addition, throughout the campaign, convoy limitations were the constraint rather than the capacity of the North African ports (10:140-41). Distribution in-theater was also a major logistical constraint. These transportation limitations would not only affect military operations but CA/MG efforts as well.

With the invasion of French North Africa, the Vichy government collapsed, and German troops moved in to occupy the rest of France. The collapse of the Vichy government allowed French forces in French North Africa to join the Allies. These forces were rearmed by the US and figured into Allied attacks in Tunisia, Italy, and Southern France

(63:17-8). However, this rearming effort used valuable shipping resources and constrained CA/MG logistical efforts in French North Africa.

With Allies attacking from the east and the British, under General Montgomery, attacking from the west, the Axis forces were eventually surrounded in Tunisia. Axis resistance in North Africa ended on May 13, 1943 with over 250,000 Axis troops taken prisoner. The care and feeding of this unplanned number of POWs also affected CA/MG logistical support (60:231).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Planning for French North Africa. Operation TORCH put the theory of civilian control of CA/MG to the test. The perceived results of this test were to affect how all CA/MG matters were conducted for the rest of the war (15:30).

The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ, under the direction of Mr. H. Freeman Mathews (US), developed the CA/MG plans for French North Africa. The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ in London was activated on 21 Aug 1942. Robert D. Murphy headed the entire Civil Affairs Section because he had first hand knowledge of French North Africa (15:31-2). He was assisted by both military and Department of State personnel. In addition, each task force had a civilian deputy civil administrator, a military assistant civil administrator, and a seven man section of technical experts.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) decided in November 1942 that civilian agencies would have primary responsibility for economic matters. Within the US this responsibility fell to the Department of State. Initially, this support was provided by the Lend-Lease Administration under the guidance of the Department of State. The Department of State also sent representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the War Shipping Administration, the Treasury Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare to assist Murphy (15:37-8).

To control North African economic matters a number of Washington agencies were established. This proliferation of agencies greatly increased problems of coordination and eventually led to many of the CA/MG problems experienced in French North Africa.

The Committee of Combined Boards (COB) was set up by the State Department to handle combined (i.e., Anglo-American) economic issues. Under the COB was the Combined Requirements Group which approved civilian supply requirements for French North Africa. The Combined Committee for North and West Africa (CCNA) was the operating arm of the COB. It was the primary interface at the combined level with Allied CA/MG personnel operating in French North Africa.

While there was a US military representative on COB, he was not a War Department representative. This meant the War Department and the JCS were frequently left out of the loop in COB deliberations. By April 1942, the War Department had its own member on the COB. The first War Department representative was from OPD. When the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department was formed in March 1943, the CAD sent the War Department representative to the COB (13:321).

The Interdepartmental Advisory Board under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Foreign Territories dealt with implementing economic and social aspects of the French North Africa program. The Office of Foreign Territories was set up by the State Department to act as the coordinating agency between Mr Murphy and the combined boards on economic and social issues. However, questions on relief efforts, public health, and rehabilitation were under the Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.

Within the North African theater, the North African Economic Board (NAEB) carried out the State Department's economic program. The NAEB consisted of both military and civilian representatives with Mr Murphy as chairman. The functions of the NAEB included: (1) supplying essential materials to the civilian population and vital utilities,

(2) purchasing strategic materials for later use in United Nations operations, (3) handling currency and financial problems, (4) maintaining, repairing and expanding vital transportation facilities, (5) maintaining public health, and (6) expanding food and industrial production to meet the needs of civilian and military personnel.

Besides the complexity of dealing with a myriad of civilian agencies, CA/MG planning was hampered because no one knew for certain how the French and the local population would react to the Allies landing in French North Africa. As a result, two sets of plans were drawn - one assuming a friendly reception and the other assuming a hostile reception (39:57).

At the time of Operation TORCH, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were all under European control. Morocco was divided into three parts. Spanish Morocco, situated along the northern coast, accounted for about five percent of Morocco. The small area around the port of Tangier was an international trust. The rest of Morocco was under Vichy French control though French Morocco was nominally ruled by the Sultan of Morocco. Algeria was the most nearly French of the three French colonies. About 10 per cent of the population were naturalized French citizens. In addition, Algeria was represented in the prewar legislatures of the Third French Republic, and was ruled by a Governor General.

Tunisia was nominally ruled by the Bey of Tunis. However, both Morocco and Tunisia were actually ruled by a French Resident General who was aided by a French staff. Before the war, local civil administration in each of the colonies was performed by native officials. Under Vichy, most leading administrative positions were filled by French military officers (39:16-7).

The large size, multiple ethnic groups (French, Arabs, Berbers, and Jews), and difficult terrain, which limited routes between areas to the coastal regions, meant control of the civilian population in French North Africa was a key ingredient to protecting the military's lines of communications, and to the success of Operation TORCH (39:17).

Military manning for CA/MG duties was to be kept to a minimum. There were several reasons for this decision. First, not many CA/MG officers existed at this time. Second, as discussed in Chapter II, the issue of civilian versus military control of CA/MG was not yet resolved. Third, the entire thrust of Operation TORCH was a quick strike with limited resources. Consequently, transportation resources could not be spared to move large numbers of CA/MG officials. Neither could combat troops be spared to perform these functions.

Because of this manpower shortage, it was decided to rely almost exclusively on French and local personnel to govern French North Africa. This decision also fit Allied political objectives which were to win the campaigns in French North Africa and let the French work out any internal problems unaided by the Allies. The result was an Allied CA/MG structure designed to supervise existing Vichy agencies. Past political sympathies of French and local officials were not as important as administrative abilities (39:57; 15:32-3).

For this approach to work, the Allies had to select a French official to govern the three colonies who would be responsive to the Allies, yet acceptable to the local population. Three possible leaders were discussed: General Charles de Gaulle, General Henri Giraud, and Admiral Jean Francois Darlan. De Gaulle had the backing of the French resistance but was not very popular in French North Africa where he was viewed as acting against the Vichy Government and the best interests of France. General Giraud was the Allies' choice as he was the most sympathetic to their cause. However, the vast majority of Frenchman in French North Africa saw him as an able General but not as a political leader. Admiral Darlan, with his close ties to Marshall Petain and the Vichy government, was supported by most Frenchman in French North Africa. Ultimately, the

choice was made to go with Darlan after secret contacts were made with him to see if he was sympathetic to the Allies.

The choice of a Vichy official to rule French North Africa was not popular in the US, but Darlan was seen as the one most able to control the local population. As General Patton wrote to Eisenhower in November 1942:

As I see it, the French position in Morocco rests almost entirely on the mythical supremacy of France, which at the present time is represented to the Arab mind by Darlan as a direct emissary from the Marshall [Petain] ... I am convinced that the Sultan ... is wholly for us, but he has not the authority or the means of controlling the Arabian tribes whereas the French prestige, nebulous as it may seem to us, can and will maintain order. (7:125)

Without such a person, General Patton estimated it would take about 70,000 Allied troops to forcibly rule French North Africa - troops which were needed for combat (15:34-6).

A great deal of thought also went into economic plans for French North Africa. Given the expected large purchases of labor and materials by the Allies, the question of currency arose. The need to keep the invasion a secret meant the Allies were not able to get sufficient quantities of the local currency before the invasion. So, the local currency was supplemented with special invasion currency which would be exchanged for local currency at rates favorable to the local population once the area was under Allied control. As part of the emphasis on civilian control

of CA/MG, finance officers were commissioned directly from their civilian positions. There was also significant cooperation between the Departments of State, Treasury, and War on financial matters (39:58).

Considerable thought was also given to controlling importation of consumer goods and using these goods to influence the local population. Arrangements were made to control the importation of cotton goods, tea, sugar, coal, gasoline, kerosene, candles, and soap. Distribution of these goods to the local population would be based on employment or other services provided to the Allies. To meet the initial needs of the invasion, approximately 500 tons of consumer goods were requested by the CA section to be included on the first landing ships. These goods would indicate the support which would be forthcoming from the Allies if the local populations cooperated (15:34). In addition, 30,000 tons of civilian supplies were expected to be required each month.

Because the Army controlled shipping resources, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA) feared the Army would exclude its cargo and circumvent OLLA by providing its own civilian supplies (15:39). This view was partly reinforced by War Department Supply Services personnel who viewed Eisenhower as having final say as to what cargo - military or civilian - would be placed on convoys heading

for North Africa. Eisenhower would also assign the shipping priority for all cargo. This proved to be the case once the Allies were in French North Africa.

In-theater control of civilian supplies was also hotly debated. OLLA wanted Mr Murphy to have responsibility while the War Department wanted Eisenhower to control them. The matter was left to be resolved by Eisenhower. He stated he wanted control, and he would use the NAEB, under Mr Murphy's direction, to distribute the goods (15:44-45).

CA/MB plans for French North Africa were publicly issued in AFHQ General Orders on 11, 12, and 21 Oct 1942.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in French North Africa.

Civilian Supplies. Providing sufficient quantities of civilian supplies proved to be an enormous challenge. These supplies were seen as critical to the war effort but, as will be seen, the problem of providing them was never completely solved.

Starting in December 1942, Eisenhower expressed concern over the lack of civilian supplies and the implications these shortfalls might have on military operations, particularly the long unprotected communication line from Casablanca to Tunisia. Despite his concerns, Eisenhower refused to ship civilian supplies ahead of military cargo. Rather, he requested additional ships from the War

Department. Pending additional shipping, civilian supplies were only shipped as broken stowage (15:50-1).

The inability of the Allies to clear North African ports was also a constraint on providing civilian supplies. For example, in late December 1942 Eisenhower had to reduce requirements for grain from initial estimates of 280 thousand tons for the next five months (or about 56,000 tons per month) to 10,000 tons per month because the Allies were unable to clear larger quantities of goods from the ports. Eisenhower also requested an initial shipment of 40,000 tons of grain plus consumer goods to mitigate against expected hoarding by the Arabs.

During the initial months after the invasion, OLLA experienced difficulty providing civilian supplies. In the first instance, this difficulty was due to the relatively short notice given OLLA to provide civilian supplies. As a result, convoys were scheduled to sail before Lend-Lease goods were available. In those instances Army port stocks were used as substitutes for Lend-Lease (15:51). In the long run the inexperience of OLLA in procurement was the greatest difficulty. Before Operation TORCH, OLLA had acted as a general staff with each Lend-Lease country providing a mission to handle procurement details. In French North Africa, OLLA was given procurement duties it was ill equipped to handle (15:58-9).

The multiplicity of civilian agencies dealing with civilian supplies and the lack of an overall coordinating agency meant much duplication of effort and confusion over responsibilities. Dealing with all these civilian agencies was a real headache for Eisenhower (46:739-41).

To complicate matters further, the campaign for Tunisia raised the issue of military or civilian control of civilian supplies in combat areas. All parties agreed the military should run such operations until hostilities ended. This meant the Army was responsible for procuring and distributing civilian supplies in Tunisia, and coordinating civilian efforts in the rest of French North Africa. In practice, the same people in the NAEB and representatives from OLLA, State, and OPRRO who worked under Murphy's Civil Affairs Section directed the relief effort (15:54-5). In Tunisia, as elsewhere, the lack of adequate transportation resources proved to be the greatest problem with civilian supplies.

The mix of goods supplied and how they were distributed were also sources of concern. Civilian supplies came from several sources including Lend-Lease goods, Army barter goods, and British goods. These goods were pooled by the NAEB and then divided into four categories. The largest category was goods to be distributed through normal civilian channels. The second category was gifts made to hospitals,

charitable institutions and the like. The third category was goods sold through Army operated stores to dock workers, airport workers and other groups working for the Allies. The fourth category was emergency goods stockpiled for use in the Tunisian campaign (15:53).

The amount of civilian supplies provided was also of grave concern. The COB and Governor Lehman, in charge of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRRO), among others, felt AFHQ requests for civilian supplies exceeded the minimum required to sustain the population. If true, this would mean resources were being diverted from more essential areas to North Africa. There is some evidence to support this concern such as the importing of women's stockings, nail polish, and the like. However, the major debate concerned importing industrial goods. This debate occurred in each subsequent US CA/MB effort in World War II.

The US decision to minimize importing industrial goods (that is, to not emphasize rehabilitating liberated and occupied territories) proved to be one of the mistakes made in the area of CA/MB logistics. For example, as discussed below, the delay in importing agricultural equipment and supplies into French North Africa meant the Allies had to wait an additional year before they could increase food production in the area. Consequently, scarce shipping

resources were used in 1943 to import food into North Africa to support Allied troops rather than relying on increased local production.

The idea of providing relief and not rehabilitation originated because of several factors. One was the shortage of shipping during 1942 and early 1943 when this decision was made. It also was the result of feelings that with the exception of wheat and soybeans there were no surplus food stocks in the US. Also, luxury goods provided to French North Africa were difficult to obtain in the US and subject to high pilferage when they arrived in French North Africa. The last factor was Roosevelt's decision, in April 1943, to give the Army primary responsibility for civilian supplies pending some appropriate civilian agency (then expected to be the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency or UNRRA for short) taking over this function at some unspecified future date.

The Army viewed the primary role of CA/MG as controlling the civilian population so they did not interfere with military operations. Long range politico-economic issues were outside its scope and were not considered. Given this outlook, it is not surprising the Army viewed its civilian supplies function as one of providing minimum essential supplies necessary to prevent

civil unrest and diseases that would endanger the troops (15:76-7).

Overall, in spite of the problems mentioned above, the goal of providing 30,000 tons of civilian supplies per month was met. However, the lack of emphasis on industrial goods had several deleterious effects on Allied operations though none of them were serious enough to markedly effect military operations. The lack of spare parts and vehicles meant that the already inadequate transportation infrastructure deteriorated further. In addition, food was being imported from the US to cities along the coast because internal transportation resources were inadequate to move food from the countryside to the cities. The movement of supplies between areas was hampered, and the Allies had to provide vehicles to support the French in this area. Also, importing agricultural equipment and supplies was delayed. This, in turn, delayed production of additional food which the Allies could use to offset future shipping requirements for foodstuffs from the US.

Public Health. In February 1943, Mr. Murphy requested three US Public Health Service doctors be assigned to the Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ. The doctors arrived in March and were initially assigned to the NAEB. Shortly thereafter they were assigned to the North Africa Theater of Operations, US Army (NATOUSA) surgeon's office to act as a

liaison between that office and local health officials. Another doctor and a sanitary engineer joined the office in July. Before these doctors arrived, US Army doctors met with French officials and had worked out the supplies the Allies would furnish, especially for malaria control, and for treating cholera and typhus. Even after the arrival of the Public Health doctors, US Army doctors continued to play a large public health role, especially in carrying out necessary public health measures in the field (64:219).

Because combat operations in French North Africa produced little damage in populated areas, US public health efforts were limited to assisting French public health authorities (64:221). The biggest effort was malaria control. The first months of 1943 were devoted to working out the Allied policy for malaria control. The key to the program was special malaria control and survey units. These units would carry out drainage and larvicide projects in mosquito breeding areas. However, the malarial control units did not arrive until spring of 1943 and did not start effective operations until well into the breeding season. Also, a shortage of engineering manpower delayed drainage work. As a result, malaria control in French North Africa was only moderately successful (64:213-14).

Economic and Financial Issues. In spite of detailed plans for invasion currency and arrangements to

exchange this currency for local currency, local workers, especially during initial days of invasion, displayed little interest in money. This was because there were few consumer goods available for purchase. Barter was required to hire workers and their equipment. For example, Patton reports having to pay two tug boat operators 100 lbs of flour and 100 lbs of sugar each to get them to help unload ships. As a result, he requested one or two ships loaded with sugar, tea, coffee, cotton goods, and possibly some shoes be sent at the earliest possible date (7:126).

Before World War II, French North Africa was a net exporter of food. As a result, the Quartermaster Corps wanted to export foodstuffs from French North Africa, to reduce shipment from the US of perishable items to overseas locations. The Quartermaster was generally successful in this area. Between February and June 1943, 30 percent of the vegetables consumed by US troops in North Africa were purchased locally. Also, by contracting in advance for future harvests, the Quartermaster encouraged production of foodstuffs in excess of normal civilian needs.

Starting in the summer of 1943 the US began importing seed, farm machinery, and equipment to North Africa. The goal was to procure more foodstuffs from North Africa farmers in the first half of 1944 than the 3,000 tons bought in the first half of 1943. This goal was easily met. In

the first half of 1944, 50 to 70 thousand tons of fruits and vegetables were bought, along with 5,000 tons of canned meats, and 20 to 30 thousand tons of dehydrated foods (57:141). Had the agricultural supplies been sent in time to plant for the 1943 harvest, these results could have been attained one year earlier.

Public Works. One of the functions of the NAEB was to improve the transportation infrastructure of French North Africa. The infrastructure was improved, largely by the Army Corps of Engineers.

The port facilities at Casablanca, Oran, and other minor ports had the capacity to handle the convoys; however, port clearing operations were a problem. First, the French lacked adequate motor and rail equipment to quickly and efficiently clear the ports of cargo. Most of their vehicles were old coal and steam fired vehicles. The Army had to bring in additional vehicles to help clear the ports (10:157-58). The transportation infrastructure from Oran and Casablanca to Tunisia proved inadequate, and the Allies were forced to use smaller ports closer to the Tunisian front. This exposed the shipping convoys to greater danger of attack from the enemy.

Engineering troops undertook three main types of railroad work in French North Africa. Depot track work involving construction of depot layouts and railroad sidings

was under the Corps of Engineers. The rehabilitation of rail line captured in combat zones was under the direction of the Military Railway Service. Construction after hostilities was a combined effort of Allied engineers and French civilian railroad officials (10:173).

Heavy wartime traffic caused roads to rapidly deteriorate and the Corps of Engineers was kept busy trying to keep them usable (10:163).

Labor. Extensive use of local labor was made by Allies. The largest group employed were for clearing ports. Over 1,000 civilians were employed at Casablanca and over 3,000 at Oran. Many of the workers, at first, were undernourished and ill-clad. As a result, productivity was not as high as it could be and pilferage was a major problem (10:156-57). As food and consumer goods became more readily available productivity increased. Local civilians were also used to run railroads in those areas outside the combat zone (10:168-9).

Sicily Campaign

Prelude to Sicily Campaign. Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablanca, in January 1943, to discuss the next move of the Allies. At Casablanca, the Allies decided to attack Sicily and use it as a stepping stone to the Italian mainland. This marked the first time in the war the Allies

held the strategic initiative. Several events had occurred which gave the initiative to the Allies. First, the Russians broke through at Stalingrad creating the first major defeat of the Germans. Second, the Japanese were now fairly well contained in the Pacific. Third, the British victory at El Alamein, and Allied occupation of French North Africa, also put the initiative in Allied hands (30:1).

The principle debate at Casablanca was where and how to exercise this initiative. Specifically, the debate was on how Germany was to be defeated. The British placed great emphasis on expanding the Mediterranean front, and attacking Germany through the "soft underbelly" of Europe. Roosevelt was suspicious of British colonial interests in the area, including the Balkans, and was reluctant to expand operations in the Mediterranean. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also opposed expanding operations in the Mediterranean because it would divert resources from a cross-Channel attack on Germany (30:3-4). The campaign for Tunisia also complicated matters. The campaign was taking longer than expected and using more Allied resources than initially allocated.

The British emphasized that Allied operations in the Mediterranean had forced Germany to divert 11 divisions to guard southern France. They also felt an invasion of either Sicily or Sardinia would probably lead to collapse of Italy.

This collapse, in turn, would divert more German divisions from other fronts as the Germans covered for the Italians. The major US argument in favor of further operations in the Mediterranean was that it would reduce shipping requirements by opening up the Mediterranean and eliminating the long trip around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope (30:8).

Ultimately, the US agreed to invade Sicily to help ease shipping shortage and to provide an outlet for troops once the Tunisia campaign was completed. Thus, on 18 January 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed to invade Sicily. The invasion was tentatively scheduled for 25 July. The CCS also appointed Eisenhower to lead the invasion (30:10).

Sicily was invaded on 10 July 1943. The invasion force consisted of 3,000 ships and around 500,000 Allied troops. General Sir Harold Alexander led the 15th Army Group in the assault on Sicily. The 15th Army Group was made of two task forces. The first task force was the British 8th Army led by General Montgomery. The second task force was the US 7th Army led by General Patton. While the Allies met heavy resistance in the central and eastern coast areas, General Patton easily swept through the western coast of Sicily. By 17 August Axis troops had evacuated Sicily (60:292-93).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Planing for Sicily Campaign. The decision to invade Sicily and the prospect

that a successful invasion could lead to the collapse of the Italian government raised several CA/MG questions. The first was the terms of the Armistice with Italy given a policy of unconditional surrender (30:25). The British submitted terms of surrender that would keep the existing Italian government in power provided it agreed to stop all hostilities and help the Allies as the Allies deemed necessary in the war against Germany. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department rejected this as not unconditional surrender, and the matter was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (30:25-6).

Two other CA/MG issues were raised by Eisenhower. In February 1943 Eisenhower raised the question of CA/MG policy toward an enemy territory, and the question of joint allied occupation. Specifically, he proposed a jointly administered military government under the control of the Allied Commander. Roosevelt agreed with Eisenhower's proposal and also stated that the Italians should be treated benevolently, except that Fascist leaders should be arrested (15:160).

In March 1943, AFHQ prepared a draft plan for Military Government (MG) which combined elements of US military government principles, as spelled out in AFM 27-5, with the lessons learned in the recent British experience in North Africa. The AFHQ plan called for equal partnership between

the British and Americans in the government (15:162-3). Both Roosevelt and Churchill wanted their country to be the senior partner. Debate over this issue delayed approval of AFHQ's plan until mid April 1943, when both Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with Eisenhower that coequal partners were best (15:165-66).

Delays in getting Allied personnel at AFHQ to plan CA/MG operations also delayed detailed CA/MG planning until late May 1943 (15:163-4). At this time the decision was made to exclude civilian agencies from planning. Nominally this was done for security, but the military had already decided it wanted to keep civilians out of MG based on its experience in French North Africa (15:164). Also, it was decided the AFHQ CA/MG planning staff would be headed by Major General Lord Rennel on the British side and Colonel Charles M. Spofford on the US side.

The next major planning issue centered on the chain of command for the Allied Military Government (AMG). The War Department wanted the AMG to fall under the tactical chain of command. Eisenhower proposed a dual chain of command. Under this dual chain CA officers would assist tactical commanders during the assault, but a separate AMG organization would follow-on and report directly to Eisenhower.

Eisenhower favored this dual chain for several reasons. First, because the AMG machinery would remain after the tactical troop left, a separate chain would lead to more continuity. Second, after the invasion there would be no central Italian authority over Sicily, but local administration was set up with a central authority in mind. Eisenhower would substitute the AMG for this central authority rather than decentralized control under each taskforce commander. Third, Eisenhower felt that AMG should follow existing local government boundaries because local government machinery was not being replaced. Eisenhower did not feel tactical control would exactly follow local administration boundaries (15:169). Ultimately, the dual chain was adopted.

Direct rule or indirect rule of Sicily was the next issue faced by CA/MB planners. Roosevelt favored direct rule of Sicily by replacing top Fascist leaders with military personnel. The British following their experience with colonial administration favored indirect rule (15:171). Lord Rennell favored indirect rule because it minimized the number of Allied Civil Affairs personnel. He also felt the use of local superiors would lead to greater cooperation, and less of a language barrier. In addition, he believed the opportunity for advancement to positions that would otherwise be held by military officers under direct rule

would encouraged subordinates to be more loyal. Finally, he wanted to avoid the look and feel of a colonial administration (15:171-2). Ultimately both Roosevelt and Churchill left the decision to Eisenhower. The lack of qualified CA/MB personnel led Eisenhower to institute indirect rule (15:173).

The issue of exchange rates between US and British occupancy currency and the lire was also raised. The current Fascist controlled exchange rate was about 20 lire per dollar. The British wanted an exchange rate of 480 lire per pound and 120 lire per dollar. The US felt this rate was too unfavorable to the Sicilians. The US proposed an exchange rate of between 60 and 75 lire per dollar (15:176-7). A compromise was reached at 100 lire per dollar and 400 lire per pound (the exchange rate between the dollar and the pound being fixed at four dollars per pound) (15:178). This exchange rate of 100 to 1 effectively devalued the lire by over 80 percent, and led to higher prices once Allied troops started spending their pay in Sicily.

As debate was resolved on each of these various points the CCS issued directives on CA/MB planning to AFHQ. The final directive was issued on 28 June 1943. This directive provided for joint administration by coequal partners, no political representatives on AMG, no civilian participation, a benevolent attitude toward the Sicilians by AMG officials,

dissolution of the Fascist Party, imprisonment of war criminals, annulling of any discriminatory laws, prompt release of political prisoners, and the respecting of the position of the Church in Sicilian life (15:177-8).

The CCS directives also contained monetary, fiscal, and economic guidelines. Monetary guidelines included the issuing of US and British invasion currency, the issuing of occupation currency (Allied military lire), and setting the official exchange rates between these currencies and the local lire.

Fiscal guidelines included establishing an Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA) to act as the central bank for Sicily. Provisions were made for the Bank of Sicily to act as an agent of AMFA. All receipts and funds for civil administration were to go through AMFA. In addition, local banks, railways, postal, telegraph, telephone, radio, and other government monopolies were placed under military control. All revenues collected by these agencies were available for use by the AMG. All tax receipts were to be deposited with AMFA or its agent, the Bank of Sicily (15:178-9).

Economic guidelines included the furnishing of civilian supplies for sale through existing commercial channels. Direct relief was to be used only where absolutely necessary. The AMG was also responsible for procuring

materials needed to operate the various utilities, and to maintain agricultural production. The AMG would also procure strategic materials needed for export to the United Nations. Price controls and rationing were to be instituted, and black market operations suppressed. Labor relations were also to be controlled to ensure fair dealings with local workers including, if necessary, dictating wages and working hours. Finally, a system of licensing exports would be introduced to control exports and to make sure exports only went to friendly countries (15:179-80).

With these CCS directives in hand, AFHQ proceeded to develop the detailed plans for the establishment of an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). The objectives of AMGOT were to: (1) insure the security of occupying forces and their lines of communication, (2) restore law and order and where necessary to provide emergency relief, (3) relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing civil administration, (4) make available to occupying forces the economic resources of occupied territory, and (5) promote political and military objectives of the Allied forces. General Sir Harold Alexander was designated the Military Governor of Sicily.

AMGOT was organized with a Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Major General Rennell, and a Deputy, Colonel Spofford. Six special divisions were organized: Legal, Financial, Civilian

Supply, Public Health, Public Safety, and Enemy Property. Local military administration of Sicily was done through Civil Affairs officers stationed in important cities and towns. Civil police functions would fall under Allied Civil Police officers also stationed at important cities and towns (15:182).

During the assault phases, Civil Affairs officers would fall under the direction of the tactical commander. At the same time, two AMGOT headquarters were established - one for each assault task force. Once a substantial portion of Sicily was occupied, these two headquarters would be consolidated (15:183-4).

The Legal Division of AMGOT prepared 12 proclamations to be issued by the Civil Affairs officers in Sicily. The proclamations had two objectives. First, they would insure the safety and security of combat forces. Second, they would promote the welfare of the inhabitants. In practice, these proclamations restated the policies spelled out in the CCS directives discussed above (15:187).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in Sicily. Sicily, about the size of Vermont, is a dry mountainous island. It had a population of about 4.5 million, about half of whom lived at a subsistence level as agricultural laborers. Though there were no industrial resources to speak of and agricultural was the main source

of employment, over half the people lived in towns (5:124). As a result, the bulk of the population was adversely affected by the Allied strategic bombing of Sicily.

Assault Phase. With the invasion of Sicily, most local and party officials fled Sicily. The lower level officials who stayed had neither the training nor the ability to take their place. More importantly, it soon became clear that the organizations which controlled Sicilian life had collapsed long before the invasion. For example, farmers routinely sold food on the black market and official rations were not sufficient to sustain the population. In addition, many items were nominally rationed (that is ration books existed) but the items were never available to be rationed (6:114).

Not surprisingly, Civil Affairs Officers found conditions to be quite chaotic during and immediately following the assault. Col Spofford identified many of the lessons learned during this phase. First, he found CA/MG personnel needed to "sell" their services to tactical commanders. Tactical commanders did not appreciate the role of CA officers, and tended to disregard them. CA officers also needed to join their tactical units prior to D-Day. This was so they could establish contact with the individuals with whom they were going to coordinate. The invasion also demonstrated the need for CA officers to be

present at the time a city or town is invaded to help the commander deal with civilian problems arising immediately with invasion.

Spofford also found organic transportation for CA officers was essential. Without organic transportation, CA officers were forced to rely on tactical forces or civilian resources, and neither were available during the assault. First, combat forces would not part with vehicles during combat. Second, operational forces got priority on commandeering civilian vehicles.

Spofford also found the number of personnel assigned CA duties was not sufficient - especially, clerks, interpreters, and guards. There were numerous cases of looting by civilians and troops because of a lack of security forces. Interpreters were lacking knowledge of local dialects and were not trained in dealing with foreign cultures (26:121-2).

Supplies were also a problem for CA officers. Not only were rations difficult to obtain for themselves, but CA officers lacked transportation to move civilian supplies to where they were most needed. In addition, medical supplies were not issued to CA officers. The distance from army field hospitals and the lack of transportation aggravated this condition (15:198-9).

Civilian Supplies. Before the invasion, Allied propaganda to the Sicilians stressed they would be better fed if they surrendered to the Allies. Unfortunately, this propaganda effort was not coordinated with supply agencies. The Army refused to schedule an initial shipload of food for Sicily. Even when supplies did arrive they were not adequate (6:136).

Food rations were limited to 1000 calories per day. However, fruits and vegetables were not rationed. In addition, a thriving black market in food also helped the Sicilians supplement the 1000 calorie ration (6:138).

Public Health. Medical doctors assigned to AMGOT worked to restore local public health departments, rebuild water and sewerage systems, and reactivate local public health services. Local officials were helped by Army medical personnel, who provided medical supplies when necessary to protect the health of Allied troops in the area. The biggest problems facing public health officials were sanitation, potential epidemics, care of destitute refugees, and control of malaria and venereal diseases.

At AFHQ public health officers made surveys on the status of local hospital facilities, the need for medical relief supplies, the nutritional needs of population, the presence of epidemic diseases, and the possibility of

introducing new diseases by insects carried on planes and returning refugees (64:221).

Public Works. The efforts to restore public facilities was one of the bright spots for AMGOT in Sicily. Within a year of the Allied invasion all railroad bridges, important highways, and public utilities were restored. Because the Corps of Engineers' primary task was to support combat troops, AMGOT officers were most useful in arranging for continuity between Allied reconstruction projects and subsequent civilian ones. This continuity was easier to arrange because the same contractor used by the Army could continue on the project under AMGOT. In addition, because all construction work (Allied or civilian) was charged to the Sicilian government, financial arrangements were streamlined during this conversion from military to civilian projects (6:142-3).

Economic and Financial Issues. Besides controlling imports and exports, price control was the major activity of AMG. Their record on this score was abysmal (6:138). The unfavorable exchange rate set by the Allies help create high inflationary pressures and spurred the black market. Allied troops, because of the favorable exchange rate, quickly cornered the market for local goods. Shop keepers were able to quadruple prices on the ground the lire was now worth less than one fourth of what it was

before the invasion. Few controls were placed on Allied troops spending their pay. In a country already short of supplies, this lack of control on Allied spending played havoc with the availability and prices of consumer goods (6:140).

Labor. Local labor again proved very useful to Allied efforts, especially in the transportation arena (10:199-202). In Sicily, as in North Africa, the distribution of men and materiel was principally by railroad. AMGOT organized native railway men to open new lines, effect repairs, and keep supplies moving from the ports to the railhead. US Army efforts were so successful in this area that more tonnage was delivered to railheads than could be promptly unloaded.

To prevent civilian traffic from interfering with military traffic on main roads AMGOT issued regulations for civilian traffic (10:201-2). Local pack animals were also used for transportation in the mountainous areas. During military operations one fourth of the 4,000 pack animals were lost to enemy fire. This loss of animal transport was a serious blow to an area dependent on animal transportation.

Generally speaking civil affairs activities during the combat phases were successful in that they aided combat

operation. The same can not be said for AMBOT operations in Sicily after hostilities ended.

The poor performance of CA/MG logistics in Sicily is illustrated in a field study of a typical Sicilian village conducted by Vincenzo Petrullo in 1947-8 (51:123-130). Mr. Petrullo studied the village of Randozzo, which was almost totally destroyed by Allied bombing in 1943. Black market activity was still very strong in 1948, five years after Allied occupation. There had been little rehabilitation of the economy. Housing was still scarce. Multiple families shared the same home. Petrullo found as many as 11 people sharing a single room. Not surprisingly, given the crowded living conditions, health conditions were also poor. Returning Italian soldiers had brought back new types of malaria and at least 60 percent of population were infected with these new types. About 80 percent of children suffered from diarrhea. Cases of tuberculosis and syphilis were on the rise. But there were only 4 doctors and 2 state paid mid-wives to care for a town of 14,000.

Unemployment was also a very serious problem. Even those who found work were employed only 180 days per year and earned about \$75 per year. The low wages and high prices of consumer goods (for example, a cheap pair of shoes cost \$12 or about 2 months work) meant there was little commerce in the town.

Petrullo summed up this typical Sicilian town as follows:

Depending on a marginal agricultural economy, immeasurably impoverished by the destruction of the town, unable to emigrate both because of lack of money and because there is nowhere to go, more or less ignored in over-all plans for the rehabilitation of Italy because of their relative unimportance, the people feel abandoned. (51:129-30)

With the invasion of Italy in September 1943, AMGOT activities extended to mainland Italy as well as Sicily. Consequently, AMGOT activities in Sicily after this time are discussed with the rest of Italy in the next section.

Italian Campaign

Prelude to Italian Campaign. With the rather quick fall of Sicily, the Allies found themselves considering invading mainland Italy. Churchill continued to push for invading southern Italy to use it as a jumping-off point for invading the Balkans. In addition, the airfields around the city of Foggia in southern Italy would allow Allied bombers to reach Rumanian oil fields. The US finally agreed to invade and occupy Italy in exchange for a firm date of 1 May 1944 for the cross-Channel invasion of the Continent (60:296-97).

On September 3, 1943 the British and Canadians crossed the Straits of Mesina to attack the Calabria area of southern Italy. Meanwhile the US prepared to land at

Salerno on 9 September (60:297). Thus, began the long and arduous battle for Italy. A battle that took considerably longer than planned, and consumed more resources than expected.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Planning for Italian Campaign. Much of the initial CA/MB planning for Italy centered around the terms of the Armistice. The US Army, following Roosevelt's lead on unconditional surrender, did not feel any special terms other than unconditional surrender were required. The British, on the other hand, wanted to include political and economic considerations in the armistice. As a result, two sets of Armistice terms were developed and ultimately used. The short terms, which were signed on 3 September, dealt with unconditional surrender by the Italians and the requirement for them to become cobelligerents against the Germans. The long terms, based on the British proposal, were signed on 29 September. The long terms of the armistice covered the economic and financial relationships between the Allies and Italy, reparations, disarmament, demobilization, demilitarization, elimination of Fascist elements and laws, and the creation of a control commission to oversee compliance with these armistice terms once Italy declared war on Germany (15:234-5). On 13 October, Italy declared war against Germany, and the Allied Control Council was activated (15:219-221).

The desire to achieve a "friendly" occupation of Italy was, in part, pragmatic. The Allies knew they did not have enough trained CA/MG personnel to govern the Italians directly. As in North Africa, the solution was to seek some form of indirect rule. The existence of an ongoing AMG operation in Sicily further constrained the planning options available to the Allies. Basically, the AMG planned for Italy would have to be compatible with AMBGT in Sicily. The fall of Mussolini on 26 July also effected CA/MG planning by increasing the likelihood of an early fall of Italy. The result of these factors was a two phased CA/MG organization.

The organization of CA/MG in Italy was in two phases. Tactical CA/MG officers under the command of the 15th Army Group were responsible for CA/MG affairs during hostilities. This group is generally referred to as AMG. After hostilities, the Allied Control Council (ACC) would supervise the Italian government in the rear areas. In any event, a considerable number of CA/MG personnel would be required. Just to cope with Allied advances up the boot of Italy to Rome, it was estimated that 1395 CA/MG officers would be required. These estimates proved to be low (15:222).

Many of the tactical CA officers were to come from the AMBGT on Sicily. The idea was to take advantage of their experiences gained in Sicily. These tactical units were

under the control 15th Army Group, and were to support the operational commanders. At the same time, an AMG Headquarters was established in AFHQ. This organization would have responsibility for MG in rear of combat zone and would interface with the Allied Control Council (ACC) (15:254). This dual control proved unwieldy, and the 15th Army Group was disbanded in January 1944. Tactical units then fell under the operational control of tactical commanders and the technical direction of ACC (15:265).

The Allied Control Council was formed to administer the long terms of the armistice. Its formation had been contingent on the Italians declaring war of Germany. When this occurred on 13 October, the Allies recognized Italy as a cobelligerent and the ACC was activated (15:244-5). The CA/MG chain of command would go from AFHQ to the ACC, then to MG regional headquarters, then to provincial MG teams, and finally down to municipal AMGs (6:115).

Initially, the ACC was divided into four sections: Military, Political, Economic and Administration, and Communications (15:257). The Military section was divided into subsections dealing with naval forces, land forces, air forces, POWs, war material factories, and material disposal. The Political section was divided into subsections dealing with foreign and internal political affairs, civilian internees and displaced persons, and information, press and

censorship. The Economic and Administration section was divided into two subsections: Economics and Administration. The Economic subsection was, in turn, divided into subcommissions on finance, foreign trade, industry and commerce, public works and utilities, fuel, food, agriculture, forests and fisheries, and labor. The Administration subsection was divided into subcommissions covering: interior, legal, public safety, education, fine arts and archives, public health, and property control. The Communications section was divided into subcommissions on shipping and ports, inland and civil air transportation, and postal and telecommunications. Overtime this organizational structure was streamlined, but none of the functional areas were eliminated (15:266-70).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in Italy.

Civilian Supplies. With the Armistice, conditions for the average Italian deteriorated. Italy had been weakened by years of war. Meat was in such short supply that any living animal was likely to be hunted. A long growing season meant enough fruit and vegetables were produced, but there were no marketing systems to bring the food to the people. Consequently, the urban population would go to the countryside to forage for food. As Allied supplies poured into Italy, the Italians, desperate for

goods, began to steal Allied material and a thriving black market grew even larger. Pilferage became so prevalent that one third of all Allied supplies sent to Italy were stolen (1:167).

Civilian supply was a mammoth task (6:136-7). For example, prior to the final Italian campaign in April 1945, over 24 million Italians were being supported by the Allies. Over 2.5 million tons of supplies worth \$300 million had been imported. Over 1 million tons in wheat and flour were imported. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) were second in importance after foodstuffs. By April 1945, 90 million gallons of gasoline and oils had been imported for the Italians.

Distribution of these massive quantities of supplies was a problem (6:136-7). At first, the food stuffs were delivered directly from the ports to the communes by US Army trucks. This lack of control fueled losses of goods to the black market. As a result, an internal AMG distribution system, including warehouses and supply accounting, was established. This was very expensive and manpower intensive. Finally, the Allies developed a system where goods were immediately turned over to Italian authorities, who were responsible for distribution.

Public Works. As the Germans retreated towards Rome, they systematically destroyed public facilities. In

Naples the Germans were particularly thorough. Long time-delay bombs were planted throughout the city. The most notorious example, was the alleged planting of several thousand bombs linked to the electrical supply. On 23 October, the day the Allies where to restore electrical power to Naples, a German straggler informed the Allies of the existence of bombs wired to into the dormant power system. When the power was restored these bombs would go off. The Allies had to evacuate the entire 1.5 million in Naples before the power could be restored. Luckily no bombs exploded (1:167-8).

Italy was also the first place where Allies were faced with governing cities ruined by strategic bombing and artillery fire. For example, in Milan over one third of the city's 930,000 residences were destroyed or severely damaged (1:176-7).

Public Health. During the assault phase, emphasis was placed on removing health hazards, such as dead bodies and garbage. With the help of army engineers, power, water and sewers were then restored. With the establishment of the ACC, public health activities were split into two functions. One group was attached to each of the Allied Armies. Their function was to help clean up occupied cities, restore utilities, rehabilitate local hospitals, provide adequate sanitation, and issue food and drugs where

necessary. Army public health officers were aided by Red Cross workers.

The second public health group was attached to the ACC. Their function was to reestablish local public health administration, and work sanitation and preventive medicine issues such as typhus control. Typhus, malaria, and venereal diseases were major health hazards to troops, but the diseases could only be attacked by treating local population as well. In addition, local doctors were encouraged to continue their practices, but hospitals were supervised by ACC personnel. The Allies continued to provide drugs for civilian use (64:361-2).

Controlling typhus in southern Italy was probable the biggest Allied health concern during the campaign for Italy. Initial planning called for the use of methyl bromide as a delousing agent. Difficulties in procurement prevented the Allies from stocking adequate quantities before the invasion. In addition, suitable hand dusters were also in short supply. In October 1943, the Army tried to order a new top secret chemical called DDT to kill typhus bearing lice. In November, the War Department turned down the AMG request for DDT to treat civilians, and a separate AFHQ request for DDT to treat Allied troops. Typhus control measures were also hampered by the lack of personnel and equipment. In addition, the Allies had not been able to

organize Italian health officials for effective assistance. Finally, on December 5, 1943, the War Department approved both requests for DDT. Delousing began on 12 December, with a massive delousing campaign beginning in late December. Control of delousing efforts was turned over to ACC on 20 February 1944 (64:362-5). Between mid-December 1943 and May 1944 over 3,000,000 applications of dusting powder were made.

As the Allies drove north, changes were made in the political and administrative structure in Italy that affected public health efforts. In the rear areas, Army responsibility for civilian health matters was largely advisory. Even medical supplies provided by the Allies were distributed through an agency set up by the Italian government. In the combat zone, the emphasis was still on restoration of water, power, sewers, and the like (64:519-520).

In the final drive of the campaign for Italy, there were relatively few public health problems. The collapse of the Germans was so swift the northern Italian cities suffered little damage. In addition, partisans, cooperating with the Allies, were able save most public utilities from destruction (1:196). As a result, the primary public health problems were ones of food, clothing, hospitalization, and medical supplies (64:520).

Economic and Financial Issues. As in Sicily, the AMG record on price controls was poor (6:138-46). At first the AMG tried to avoid price controls in Naples. It was three months before prices were posted and attempts were made to enforce these prices. A low ranking committee was set up by ACC in the winter of 1943-44 to monitor price controls. However, no effective guidance came from this central committee. Furthermore, regional governments were not provided with price control staffs. By early 1945, it was virtually impossible to determine what the legal price was for any item. Without this centralized support, regional units were unable to enforce anything.

As in Sicily, the failure of effective price controls lead to hoarding, and to an extensive (and sometimes government sanctioned) black market. This removal of a substantial quantity of goods from the commercial market also affected the amount of tax revenues collected.

To be effective price controls need to be accompanied by wage controls. AMG's record on wage controls is worse than that on prices. At first, wages were frozen; however, this policy was quickly disregarded. US Army units quickly started paying higher wages under the naive theory that higher wages meant a higher standard of living. Of course, these wage increases were unrelated to productivity improvements, and they merely led to higher prices. As a

result, an inflationary spiral was set in motion. Consequently, the legal maximum for wages was adjusted twice by about 70 percent (6:141). The result was a declining standard of living for the working and middle classes.

At first AMG paid relatively little attention to reviving the Italian industrial base. Eventually, ACC realized that Italian industry was necessary to pay for needed imports. These imports were currently being paid for by the Allies, and were becoming a major drain on Allied resources. The first problem in reviving the Italian industry was the lack of raw materials. Italian industry was dependent on coal for power. However, the importation of coal was delayed, and quantities were only sufficient for Allied needs and the heating of essential facilities such as hospitals. Other raw materials such as cotton were also in short supply.

The second problem in reviving the Italian industry dealt with the competition for resources between military needs and civilian needs (6:144-5). As part of the Armistice, the Allies had full rights of requisition. This, plus the belief the rights of the military and "military necessity" outweighed civilian needs, meant the military got first priority on all resources. Eventually, the level of poverty in Italy reached the point the condition of the civilian population was seen as being of military

importance. Emergency measures were introduced to prevent the population from starving.

In addition, the AFHQ Local Resources Section attempted to build a system which would allocate scarce materials such as metals, building materials, timber, and the like between military and civilian needs. First priority, of course, was given to Allied needs in the combat area. The system proved difficult to administer because local officials were reluctant to report assets available so they could be distributed by a remote headquarters.

Labor. Thomas Fisher, a former CA officer in Italy, has stated that the "lack of insight and planning for political parties and labor organizations was probably our greatest error, and was all but fatal" (25:117). Under Army control, strikes and slowdowns by labor organizations were not tolerated. Bridges, railroads, and roads needed to be repaired or battles might be lost. Once, the ACC took control the emphasis changed. The ACC was indifferent to the political orientation of labor unions, especially in the industrialized northern areas. The north was a communist stronghold, and many of the partisans were communist. Recognition of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) in July 1944 gave even more influence to the communists. The result was a sharp increase in labor unrest

as the communists tried to destabilize Italy's economic reform efforts (25:118-119).

Campaign for Southern France

Prelude to Southern France Campaign. The amphibious invasion of southern France, Operation ANVIL, was formally approved by the three Allied powers at the second Cairo Conference in December 1943. The objective was to invade southern Europe simultaneously, or immediately following the Normandy invasion. With the initial successes in Italy, the British argued that the invasion of southern France be abandoned in order to exploit the successes on the Italian peninsula. But the US insisted that Operation ANVIL take place as planned. However, the time of the invasion was postponed because of requirements for the May 1944 offensive in Italy, and the needs of OVERLORD for landing craft. On August 15 three divisions of Allied troops landed in southern France (60:323 and 64:366-7).

Eisenhower had insisted on the invasion as a means of relieving supply congestion and logistical strain. However, the campaign in the northern France proceeded too rapidly for the southern ports of France to do much good. German troops in southern France also withdrew before they were defeated or before large numbers were captured. By early September, forces in southern France had hooked up with

Patton's Army. At that point they became part of the right flank of the Allied push to Germany (60:324).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Planing for Southern France Campaign. In contrast to World War I, where CA/MG matters in France were left to the French Government and Army, World War II presented a unique problem. French civil government was either under German control or Vichy control. In either case, the French government would have to undergo some changes to be responsive to Allied requirements (Px:76). The question of which French leader would lead a liberated France also complicated Allied planning for CA/MG in France. Ultimately this was resolved with the US recognition of de Gaulle.

The initial logistical support for ANVIL came from North Africa and Italy. All men, equipment and supplies were staged in North Africa and Italy prior to invasion. It would not be until 20 Nov 1944 that all communications zone (COMZ) functions would transfer from the Mediterranean Theater to the European Theater (64:399-400).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in Southern France. Because southern France was invaded after northern France, the bulk of CA/MG activities in France are discussed in the next chapter. Only those issues that were unique to the Mediterranean theater of operation in southern France are covered here.

Civilian Supplies. Civilian supply efforts in southern France faced some unique problems. One problem was the switch from relief supplies being handled by CA personnel as in North Africa and Italy. Now the Army Quartermaster Corps was given this distribution responsibility (57:118). The initial assaults around Marseille-Toulon area lead to disruptions in food supplies (57:143). In particular, combat operations and German demolition activities disrupted civil transportation. Consequently, fresh food from the Rhone valley was not able to get through to the invasion area. This led to a severe food shortages among the local population. The Allies were forced to provide the local population with at least one meal per day. This requirement had not been planned.

The good news was that once the agricultural areas were liberated the food shortage turned into a food surplus. In addition, in the summer of 1944, North Africa contributed 49,000 tons of food for civilian relief in southern France (57:141).

Public Health. The CA/MB efforts in public health were more what the civilians did for the Allies, rather than what the Allies did for the local French population. For example, French troops involved in the invasion of southern France found they could make greater use of local hospitals around Marseille than had been planned. This use of

civilian hospitals freed evacuation hospitals for use by advancing US forces (64:387). In addition, these evacuation hospitals used French civilians in a variety of capacities, most commonly as litter bearers (64:388).

The rapid advance of the Allies during this time caused transportation problems for evacuating wounded personnel. Railroad service was not quickly restored and motor transportation was critical. This transportation shortage had one good side effect. Farmers, who were cut off from their city markets, brought the evacuation hospitals large quantities of eggs, chickens, rabbits, and ducks (64:392). Captured German medical supplies reduced the requirement for local procurement of medical supplies (64:406). Civilians were also used as blood donors (64:409).

Venereal disease control was the biggest preventative medicine concern. Once off the French coast and into rural areas, venereal disease cases were primarily the result of sexual contact in Italy during the staging period rather than the result of any contacts in southern France (64:411-2).

With the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the Mediterranean Theater became of secondary concern to the Allies. The key battles with Germany were fought in central Europe, and the major CA/MG issue was the post-war treatment of Germany.

IV. US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government: European Theater

Liberation of Europe

Operation OVERLORD. Ever since the Allies were forced out of the Continent at Dunkirk, they had been working for their return. After Pearl Harbor the Allies agreed that the first task was to stop the Japanese advances in the Pacific and then defeat the Germans. Once the Germans were defeated the Allies would turn their efforts to the defeat of the Japanese. Consequently, the US was more anxious to return to the Continent and defeat the Germans than the British (45:662). Both were in general agreement on the return. They disagreed on when. The US wanted to return as early as 1942, but this was never feasible (60:310). Next, the US argued for an invasion in 1943. While this may have been possible, Allied actions in the Mediterranean delayed the invasion until 1944. In May 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed on the invasion for 1 May 1944. However, when Eisenhower and Montgomery were transferred from the Mediterranean Theater to the European Theater, the date was moved forward to June (60:314). The reason for the delay was simple; both Eisenhower and Montgomery wanted the initial invasion to involve more troops. The original plans for invading Normandy called for three divisions over the beaches, and two by air. Both Eisenhower and Montgomery

wanted five divisions by beaches and three by air.

Ultimately, 33 divisions were to land. Normandy was a huge logistical undertaking. It involved 2,876,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen, approximately 11,000 aircraft, several thousand vessels, and much more equipment.

The initial invasion was generally a success, but took longer to achieve its objectives than expected. The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), had expected to clear the Normandy peninsula by June 23 (D+17) (60:317). By July 10 the Allies were to be at the mouth of the Seine River, and to have cut off the Brittany Peninsula. However, the Allies met heavy German resistance. Normandy was not secured until the end of July, and the Seine was not reached until the middle of August. On the 19th of August Paris was liberated. Eisenhower had wanted to delay liberating Paris because he did not want to assume the logistical burden of supporting its millions of inhabitants.

By the end of August the Allies were massed along the Seine River. The debate began on who would make the next big push forward and when this push would occur. The problem was that the Allies had outrun their supplies. There was not sufficient materiel to support the "broad front" strategy originally planned for this phase. Of course, the US wanted to lead the breakout and so did the British. Eisenhower compromised - the US Army Group under

General Courtney Hodges would join the British Army Group under General Sir Miles Dempsey to push into the low countries. The push into the low countries was successful for a while; Brussels was liberated and the port of Antwerp was captured relatively undamaged. However, the attack bogged down again because of logistical difficulties.

In the Autumn of 1944, Montgomery proposed Operation Market-Garden. The objective was to use airborne troops to secure a series of river crossings behind German lines, and have the British 2nd Army dash up this corridor and secure an Allied position in Germany. Stiff resistance by the Germans, and a supply breakdown bogged down the advancing 2nd Army just short of its final objective, the Arnhem Bridge on the Rhine River. This effort exhausted Allied resources and the final push into Germany had to wait until supplies could be built up again.

While the Allies built up supplies for a new offensive, the Germans counter-attacked in December 1944 in the Ardennes. The Battle of the Bulge exhausted the German military power, and by 7 May 1945 Germany had capitulated.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Planning for Liberation of Europe. Eisenhower was very interested in strengthening the OVERLORD attack by getting maximum support from the leaders and people of occupied Europe (53:138). Aid to the various resistance movements was one way to meet

this objective. Another method was to draw up civil affairs agreements with the governments-in-exile, and to organize SHAEF missions to deal with these governments once they were reestablished in their countries.

SHAEF Military Missions to Liberated Territories.

Between 1939 and 1941, governments-in-exile had been established for Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway in London, and in Canada for Luxembourg. De Gaulle set up a French government in exile, though it was not recognized as such by the US. With the formation of SHAEF in January 1943, there was movement to establish liaisons between the governments-in-exile and SHAEF. Liaison missions were actively pursued starting in October 1943. In January 1944, Lt Gen A. E. Grasset was selected to head the European Contact Section of SHAEF.

Even before these various military liaison arrangements were complete, the US and Great Britain were negotiating civil affairs agreements with some of the governments-in-exile (53:139-40). The purpose of these agreements was to spell out what the relationship would be between the restored governments and the Allied Expeditionary Force during the period of military control. Procedural differences between the US and UK delayed the signing of these agreements. The first agreement was between the UK and Norway. This agreement, signed on 16 May 1944, became

the model for subsequent agreements. On the same day, the US signed a separate agreement with Norway. Subsequently, agreements were also reached separately by the British and the US with Belgium and the Netherlands in June 1944 (14:134).

Each of these agreements gave the Supreme Commander governmental control in the liberated portions of each country until the Supreme Commander felt the military situation would permit a return to civil control (53:140). These agreements also gave the Allies exclusive legal jurisdiction over their troops except for offense against local laws. They also gave the Supreme Commander the power to requisition billets and supplies, and make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services necessary for military operations. In addition, claims commissions were established to sort out compensation for such requisitions. On 23 May 1944, the military missions of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway were asked to provide officers to advise Allied military authorities on civil affairs matters.

Civilian Supplies. The biggest CA/MB logistics concern for SHAEF was civilian supplies. In April 1943, JCS declared "Civilian supply is a military problem during the period of military occupation" (56:281). Roosevelt confirmed the primacy of the military in civilian supply in November 1943.

To carry out this mission, the US Army Quartermaster organized the Civilian Supply Section (CSS) of the Requirements Branch of its Military Planning Branch. During the planning phase, the CSS estimated requirements for each country. During the operations phase, it compared the theater commander's request against its own estimates. When the requests were approved, the various branches of the Quartermaster Corps - Fuels and Lubricants, Subsistence, etc. - would requisition the supplies.

From July 1943 to the end of the war in May 1945, the Quartermaster Corps shipped over 6,310,000 long tons of civilian supplies to the European and Mediterranean theaters. These supplies were worth about \$878,156,000. Also, these amounts do not include supplies provided by the British and Canadian governments. For all theaters, foodstuffs, consisting primarily of wheat flour, canned meats, dehydrated soup and can/evaporated milk, accounted for over \$669 million, and over 4.1 million long tons (55:131). Coal accounted for over \$50 million and 2.1 million long tons. Clothing accounted for \$131 million and 50,000 long tons. Agricultural supplies only accounted for \$7.7 million and 14,000 long tons. Civilian supplies shipments peaked in the second quarter of 1945. In addition, by the end of the war, roughly one third of all

supplies in the European theater were earmarked for civil affairs efforts (57:387).

In theater civilian supply requirements were computed by G-5 (Civil Affairs). SHAEF then divided the requirements between the US and the British (57:386-7). Once the supplies were in-theater, the Quartermaster Corps was responsible for distribution from the ports to the depots, and for shifts between depots. However, G-5 designated the end locations, and arranged for intra-theater shipping priorities. Issues to CA officers were in bulk at the depots. CA units were responsible for transporting supplies to the final destination.

The packaging and storage of CA supplies were continuing problems (57:387-8). Packaging of CA supplies was generally inferior to military goods, so they deteriorated rapidly when stored in the open. This was especially true for food and clothing. A shortage of storage facilities for CA supplies compounded the problem. For example, in December 1944, depot storage of 47,000 long tons was available for CA supplies. By March 1945, G-5 requested 260,000 long tons of storage, and by April there were over 300,000 long tons on-hand.

Food shortages were to develop through out Europe. This was due, in part, to the conservative planning estimates for civilian relief (57:536). The initial

estimates for civilian relief, made by the International Aid Division of the Army Service Forces in 1943, were for 282,000 long tons of food for the first three months after the invasion. This estimate would provided 20 percent of the total subsistence requirement. Later estimates were even more conservative. For example, the CCAC approved a 90 day requirement, in March 1944, of only 49,000 long tons.

Once on the Continent, CA officials concluded that the higher figures were more accurate, but still not sufficient (57:537). In France alone, it was estimated 500,000 tons would be required each month. These in-theater estimates were based on a 2,090 calorie diet with supplemental items like evaporated milk for children and coffee for adults. Even this ration was less than the POW ration, and received considerable unfavorable publicity.

After V-J Day, responsibility for civilian supplies in liberated territories was turned over to the local governments, who then got supplies through civilian agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) (56:282).

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in France. The issue of who should run France would cause the most problems for the Allies in Civil Affairs prior to the invasion. De Gaulle had established the French National Committee in London. He also had the support of many of the

resistance groups in occupied France. However, many Frenchmen supported the Vichy government. Others favored General Henri Giraud. The rivalry between these various factions made it difficult for the Allies to decide on what action to take. In French North Africa, the Allies threw their support behind Admiral Darlan. This made both de Gaulle and Giraud suspicious of the Allies. De Gaulle was also suspicious of the US because of Roosevelt's clear preference for dealing with Giraud. The Allies feared civil war could break out between these various elements once the invasion was on. Finally, the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) between de Gaulle and Giraud was reluctantly recognized by Roosevelt in August 1943. However, Eisenhower was told to deal directly with the French military on matters involving French forces. Unfortunately, this undermined the authority of the FCNL.

This question of who would run France was brought to a head by the need to establish a civil affairs agreement with someone for France. However, no agreement was reached until the Allies reached Paris in August 1944. In the mean time, Eisenhower had issued interim directives to govern Allied dealings with the French.

Eisenhower's order, that "Civil Administration in all areas will be normally controlled the French themselves," ensured that Allied efforts in France were conducted as

civil affairs and not as a military government (40:148-49). With the landings at Normandy, CA officers were instructed to secure the cooperation of the civilian police, transportation, and communications authorities without usurping civil powers. The first job of the CA officers was to appoint mayors in the towns occupied. These appointments were usually done in consultation with de Gaulle's liaison officers.

Civilian Supplies. Because of the presence of large stocks of captured enemy supplies, the availability of civilian supplies was never a serious problem in France. For example, in September 1944, the amount of captured bread, meat, grain, and other food was almost 50 times the amount distributed by CA officers from Allied stocks (40:160). There was a problem with the distribution of captured supplies between the French and the Allies. An agreement was reached in July 1944 that centralized control of relief supplies with the French General Food Administration, and specified the conditions under which captured foodstuffs would be released for civilian use.

Another major difficulty in civilian supplies was the lack of transportation (40:161). The original allotment of vehicles to CA units was based on one jeep and one half-ton truck. CA officers frequently relied on captured or abandoned enemy vehicles, usually in need of extensive

repairs, to meet their transportation requirements. To help ease this problem, the French established Civil Affairs Transportation Pools in September 1944 (40:162-3). For example, before the arrival of the 100 truck civil affairs transportation pool at Verdun, relief supplies were being distributed by five captured vehicles. The arrival of the pool allowed deliveries to increase dramatically to over 25 tons of supplies each month.

Rail was also useful in moving civilian supplies (40:163). Railroads and rolling stock were less damaged than expected, and with French aid repairs were quickly made. Increasingly, trains were used to distribute supplies especially to the larger cities. For example, in December in the 3rd Army zone, a total of 26,092 tons of food, 30,739 tons of POL, and 15,168 tons of merchandise were moved by rail.

The liberation of Paris greatly increased the demand for civilian supplies (53:258). It also interfered with the supply of fuel to combat elements. It was discovered that Paris needed about 2,400 tons of supplies daily. It was proposed that they be brought in by air. However, Air lift was scarce at this time. It was tied up supplying fuel to the advance armor columns, and in training operations for the upcoming air drops in Operation Market-Garden. Gen Bradley authorized 500 tons daily for Paris by air, at the

expense of military cargo. In addition, he called for an additional 1500 tons to be supplied daily regardless of the cost to ongoing military efforts. This massive CA efforts was one more factor in halting the Allied advance in August.

Public Works. During the invasion, thanks to the efforts of the French resistance, damage to public utilities was minimized. This was especially true for telephone and telegraph facilities (40:164). With the help of officials from the Ministry of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT), the signal Corps quickly restored key communications lines. CA officers also relied on courier service, largely performed by civilian couriers, for communications between CA units. This rather quick restoration of communication services allowed CA officers to permit civilian use of the PTT on a case by case basis. Mail service for civilians was also restored fairly quickly.

During the breakout from Normandy in September, the Allies were moving too quickly for CA units to be concerned about utilities and public works. The CA effort here was to help civilian officials conduct surveys of damaged water supplies and transmission cables. Fortunately, damage by the retreating Germans was not severe until the German retreats in November and December 1944.

Repair of electrical power was a coordinated effort of the civilian power administrations and the Army engineers

(40:164). However, repairing power plants and transmission lines was not the major problem. The main limitation on electric service was the fuel shortage. For example, fuel shortages at the end of August held power production to 5 percent of 1939 consumption. Consequently, a high priority was to return power to coal mining areas so they could to resume mining the badly needed coal.

Public Health. During the first phase of the invasion, the Allies assumed responsibility for wounded civilians (40:166-7). The Allies continued to have responsibility for critically wounded civilians even late into the campaign for France. Except for the large cities such as Paris, malnutrition was not a problem thanks to the large stocks of captured food. Preventative disease measures were needed for tuberculosis and venereal disease, but these diseases were never a problem in France the way they were in Italy.

The "standfast" policy of dealing with displaced persons also minimized public health problems. By keeping the movement of refugees to a minimum, the spread of contagious diseases was minimized. Especially during the initial phases of the campaign, Frenchman were very good about sheltering the refugees (40:154-7). These civilian efforts virtually eliminated the need for Allied intervention. As the campaign progressed, controlling the

movements of civilians was more critical. As was done in Normandy, secondary roads were designated for civilian movements to keep main roads free for military movements.

With the liberation of Paris, the refugee problem increased dramatically. Except in communities in the battle area, the standfast rule was strictly enforced for refugees. CA officers did intervene in November to allow selected farmers and civil officials to enter the battle area to harvest their crops. Overall, Allied security requirements remained paramount, and only a limited number of farmers were permitted to return. The Battle of the Bulge in December was the greatest test of the standfast rule. The standfast rule was vigorously enforced to prevent civilian traffic from strangling military movements.

With the invasion of Germany, Displaced Persons (DPs) became a major problem. Repatriation of DPs was to be a problem even after the end of the war with Germany (40:158-9). Between 1 April and 31 December 1945, over 350,000 DPs were staged through France. Health conditions in the camps housing refugees became a major public health concern.

The availability of medical supplies was not a serious problem. The Pasteur Institute in Paris had a considerable stock of medical supplies for civilian use. In addition, the Army Medical Depot furnished supplies when requisitioned by CA officers. Also, hospitals were refurbished and

supplied with equipment to allow the French to care for their own wounded and to assume medical responsibility for DP camps.

Sufficient DDT powder was made available to prevent lice infestations (40:167). As a result, less than 3 percent of DPs were found to be lice-infested. However, the sanitary conditions of the DP camps was always a source of concern and required regular monitoring.

Economic and Financial Issues. The issue of an invasion currency created considerable controversy between the US, Britain, and de Gaulle (53:231-2). The Allies wanted to avoid devaluing the franc by issuing special US dollars and British pounds. Instead, the use of special invasion currency was proposed that would be the equivalent of French francs. De Gaulle felt the issue of currency was the exclusive domain of the FCNL. No agreement was reached prior to the invasion, so the invasion currency was used. Despite the heated objections of de Gaulle the currency was well received by the French (53:233). The issue of invasion currency was not finally resolved until CA agreements were reached between the Allies and the FCNL in August 1944.

As the battle for France progressed, de Gaulle consolidated his position among the French in liberated territories (53:234). Consequently, on July 11 Roosevelt decided to recognize the FCNL as the dominant political

authority in France. A Civil Affairs agreement with the FCNL was signed on 26 August 1944 (53:319).

The issue of invasion currency died as the French banks took over the management of French finances, and the banks recognized the invasion currency as if it were issued by the Central French Treasury (53:320). Beginning on 1 November, the French government assumed the payment of wages at current legal rates for all civilians employed by the Allies in France (40:153-4).

Summary. The primary mission of Civil Affairs in France was to further military objectives through control of the civilian population (40:167). Based on this limited mission, CA efforts in France, especially the logistical aspects, can be considered a success. The control of civilian population movements, the repair of essential communications facilities, the feeding of the local population, and the public health efforts all ensured the civilian population did not hinder military operations. In fact, the efforts of the French people were of great assistance to the Allies.

However, the long term rehabilitation of France was not given adequate consideration. This failure lead to dire consequences, not only in France, but in the rest of Europe. The Marshall plan of 1948 was necessary, in large part,

because of the failure of Allied CA planning to consider long-term rehabilitation efforts for Europe.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Logistics Efforts in Norway and the Low Countries.

Belgium. British Major General G. W. E. J. Erskine headed the SHAEF mission to Belgium (53:328-9). With the liberation of Brussels, Gen Erskine's first mission was to arrange for the passage of the Belgian government from London to Brussels in time for the 19 September opening of Parliament. With this accomplished, he set about helping the Belgians resolve a number of problems including: the release of a Belgian franc prepared by the Bank of England, the disarming of resistance forces, the establishment of an armed police force to keep order, and the arming of Belgian forces to protect the Allies' communications zone in Belgium. The overall approach was to avoid interfering in the internal affairs, but rather to help it prevent civil disorders that would disrupt military operations.

The existence of an armed and uncooperative resistance force was a cause for concern by both SHAEF and the Belgium government. SHAEF wanted to recruit the resistance forces into the regular Belgium army, as part of a 35,000 man force, to aid in the offensive against Germany. Resistance members were also desired for the 10,000 man gendarmerie. However, the resistance, especially the leftist elements,

was reluctant to join the Belgian government. Tension between the two continued until the German counter-offensive in mid-December brought home the need for unified action by all Belgians if the Germans were to be defeated. The Battle of the Bulge was also to have serious CA implications for Belgium.

Belgium had been liberated fairly quickly. As a result, it had suffered relatively little damage and CA problems were minimal (53:332). However, the development of V-bombs and the German's counter-offensive changed all that. Between late fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945, the bulk of German airpower was used against Belgium in an attempt to close its port facilities. The attacks on Antwerp alone damaged two thirds of the houses. Casualties in Belgium were over 8,000 dead and nearly 24,000 wounded. CA activities centered around getting adequate food for the population, maintaining civil defense, fighting fires, and solving health problems.

The Allies saw believed adequate food supplies was the key to preventing demonstrations and strikes, getting the coal mined, and keeping the ports in full operation. However, there was a difference of opinion on the level of supplies needed to meet this objective. SHAEF felt they had delivered enough food in November for the rest of the year. Gen Erskine, on the other hand, knew food was already in

short supply, and more deliveries would be necessary in December if the Allies were to keep their promises to the Belgians. As a result, a special allotment of 10,000 tons was sent to Belgium at the expense of other Allied commitments. Even so, the German counter-offensive made the food shortage more acute. In fact, the food shortage was blamed for causing the strike of Antwerp dock workers in January 1945.

To meet this strike threat, Gen Erskine requested supplies lost in the Battle of the Bulge be replaced, and a one month reserve be established. However, civilian supplies from the US and Britain were already behind schedule. So, Eisenhower requested the CCS release 100,000 tons of CA supplies to offset the shipping lag. The CCS only released 55,000 tons with a promise that additional supplies from the US would arrive soon. In addition, the CCS blamed the current crisis on SHAEF because it did not submit its civilian supplies requirements to the CCAC until late December. To avoid this problem in the future, SHAEF asked the Belgium government in January to submit its civilian supplies requirements through November 1945.

The Netherlands. In mid-September, British Major General J.K. Edwards was named the head of the SHAEF mission to the Netherlands. Establishing the mission was delayed because the country was still in enemy hands. Also, because

the Netherlands government was located in London, the Netherlands frequently dealt directly with the British Foreign Office and not SHAEF. For example, the Netherlands requested Churchill and Roosevelt approve the Swedish Red Cross plan for shipping food and medical supplies to occupied portions of the Netherlands. Both Roosevelt and Churchill declared this was a military matter, and left decision to Eisenhower. Eisenhower approved concept. Various ways of delivering the supplies were discussed and Eisenhower decided the best course was to send aid by ship from Lisbon. The plan faltered because the Netherlands Red Cross lack the necessary transportation resources to distribute the supplies. Eventually, agreements with the Germans were necessary before supplies were moved in late January.

Besides feeding the population in occupied areas, the population in liberated areas of the Netherlands needed to be feed (53:335-6). However, the food shortage in the liberated areas reached the point where the government was forced to cut rations in liberated areas below those in occupied areas. In addition, the liberated population complained that POWs were better feed than they were. Unfortunately the food problem was not resolved before the end of the war. As a result, the Dutch were close to starvation in many areas when the war ended.

Luxembourg. Occupied Luxembourg was made an integral part of the German Reich (15:798). As such, the Luxembourg government machinery was completely destroyed. The lack of a government in Luxembourg greatly complicated Allied CA efforts in that country. The fact that Luxembourg remained for some time in the forward zone of military operation also complicated CA efforts.

The SHAEF Luxembourg mission arrived in Luxembourg hours ahead of the Civil affairs detachments under the control of the 5th Army Commander (15:810). The Commander made it clear he wanted no interference from the SHAEF mission in local CA matters. On the other hand, Prince Felix of Luxembourg was delighted to see the SHAEF mission, and he expected to coordinate CA activities through them and not the 5th Army Commander.

On their arrival the SHAEF mission found all civil functions at a virtual standstill (15:810-1). Banks, stores, and public offices were closed and had been closed since 5 September. No police force existed, but the Union of Patriots resistance group was acting as self-appointed police and the population was orderly. All communications and transportation facilities were closed, and all manufacturing had ceased. The Germans had destroyed public records with their retreat. Consequently, former Luxembourg

officials were unable to find records or other materials to help the transition back to civilian control.

The SHAEF mission had a big task ahead. It set out to establish a military force and a police force. It also wanted to reestablish the judicial system. Civil servants were appointed to fill key positions. Banks and other financial institutions were opened. Taxes were collected in marks, and used to pay government officials. Stores and shops were reopened, and essential services (telephone, utilities, and transportation) were restored.

But on 21 October, the SHAEF mission received orders to disband and for its personnel to report back to SHAEF. The CA units under the 3rd Army and the 12th Army Group would takeover. This new arrangement was to cause considerable confusion until 4 April 1945 when Gen Erskine was appointed as head of Mission to Luxembourg as well as Belgium.

Norway and Denmark. In both these Scandinavian countries the resistance forces took over from the Germans and established self-rule without significant Allied assistance. Allied CA efforts were largely one of supplying relief. Unfortunately, jurisdictional disputes between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians were to delay aid, and to cause needless suffering in Norway.

Denmark. The Danish people had ruled themselves until 29 Aug 1943 when the Germans declared martial law

(15:836-7). The Allies expected Denmark to return to a constitutional government as soon as possible after removal of the Germans. Consequently, the Allies treated Denmark as a friendly country.

The SHAEF mission to Denmark acted as a liaison between the Danish government and SHAEF. It had a port detachment under its control for Copenhagen, and another detachment for some unspecified port. The SHAEF mission also screened Danish requests for civilian supplies, and called forward supplies as it deemed necessary. The Danish government then distributed the supplies as it saw fit.

Economic issues centered around stimulating industry to minimize imports of relief supplies, and to export food stuffs to other Allied countries. Requests for importation of raw materials were also coordinated through the SHAEF mission. Because little fighting occurred in Denmark, it provided public health officials to assist other Allied countries.

When the Germans announced the surrender of its forces in Denmark, the SHAEF mission flew to Copenhagen (15:838-9). When they arrived, they found the Danish government already functioning. They also found there was a surplus of food, but a dire shortage of fuel, raw materials, and transportation. The first priority was to request fuel to get industries and transportation back on their feet. So,

the SHAEF mission requested 30,000 tons of coal for May, and 80,000 tons for June. Similar requests were made for POL. By June, the mission was making arrangements to export surplus food. The bulk of the food was sent to England and Norway. Norway alone received nearly 14,000 tons of food between May 18 and June 4 1945.

Norway. In the winter of 1944, the Russians were attacking northern Norway through Finland (15:840-1). As the Germans retreated from northern Norway, they instituted a scorched earth policy. In December SHAEF received reports that the situation in northern Norway was desperate. Consequently, 3,000 tons of supplies were authorized to be sent to northern Norway even though it was under Russian control. The first Allied officer in Norway was an American CA officer who brought in 1000 pounds of medical supplies in December 1944.

When the CA officer arrived, he found conditions to be critical. Health of the population was very poor - diphtheria was epidemic. Food supplies were very low. At this point, a bureaucratic squabble broke out over who had responsibility for providing relief supplies - SHAEF or the Russians. SHAEF maintained it was the Russians responsibility because they occupied northern Norway. As a result, the Norwegian government was told to get supplies through civilian agencies if the Russians could not help.

This suggestion was ludicrous as the Allies controlled nearly all food commodities, and there was no open market to buy supplies. This situation was particularly galling because SHAEF had already planned and set aside CA supplies for all of Norway.

The German Army surrendered to SHAEF on 8 May 1945. As was the case in Denmark, the Norwegian resistance quickly took over the country. The most pressing problems facing the new government were the care of the large number of German POWs, and the lack of food and fuel.

Norway was never self-sufficient in food, and the dislocations of war exacerbated this problem (15:845-6). In addition, fuel was needed to restart the Norwegian economy. Transportation, fishing, and other industries were dependent on fuel. On the day of liberation, 22 tons of supplies were provided via Allied destroyers which had been sent there to oversee the German surrender. Ten days later 12 ships carrying 20,000 tons of supplies were dispatched to Norway. Plans were also made to distribute an additional 21,0000 tons of food in June from British stocks and another 21,000 tons in July from US stocks. In addition, 23,550 tons of coal were programmed for May and 45,000 tons for June. In the meantime, shortages of fuel had shut down virtually all gas works, railroads, and shipping/fishing vessels in the country.

Summary. Civil Affairs rather than Military Government best characterizes US relations with the liberated countries of Western Europe. The primary CA concern was civilian supplies, particularly the need for food and coal. CA planning efforts underestimated civilian supply requirements and did not consider the long term rehabilitation needs of Western Europe. While starvation did not occur, CA efforts were not effective and western economies were slow to rebound until the Marshall Plan was begun in 1948.

Presurrender Occupation of Germany

Invasion. On 11 September 1944 the first US Army troops reached German soil (65:133). The first Civil Affairs unit was stationed at Roetgen on 15 September, and the first Landkreis (comparable to a state in the US) capital was occupied on 18 September at Monschau. In the following days, the surrounding villages were also occupied but only the occupation of Monschau had been planned by SHAEF.

Presurrender Occupation Directives. Meanwhile, the Allies were having difficulty in reaching a consensus on how to govern post-war Germany (65:99-101). The Yalta conference did not take place until January 1945 and Potsdam not until after the defeat of the Germans. In this policy vacuum, the US War Department tried to establish guidelines prior to the invasion of Germany. However, Eisenhower was a

Combined Commander and any guidance would have to be from the CCS and not the JCS.

In this environment SHAEF developed its presurrender directive. The CCS had updated its early plans for a German surrender and issued CCS Directive 551 in early August 1944, but this directive was based on the premise of a defeated Germany economically and administratively intact (59:328-9). In August 1944 SHAEF began anticipating a much different end to the war: one where Germany was totally destroyed and the government in complete collapse. Under this scenario, the job of maintaining order would fall to Eisenhower. However, he felt he would not be able to maintain order and deal with economic issues given his current manning. So, he asked Washington to relieve him of the economic responsibilities. Unfortunately, Eisenhower's cable arrived in Washington at the same time Morgenthau found out about the "soft" treatment of Germany in SHAEF's draft Handbook for Germany. In addition, the British were pushing their own views that Eisenhower should be relieved of all post-surrender responsibilities for Germany. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department intervened and ultimately a compromise was reached. The result was JCS Directive 1067, which was issued in September 1944. This was one month after the Allies entered Germany.

JCS Directive 1067 had several punitive provisions. The German economy would be controlled to only permit it to produce enough goods and services to prevent disease and unrest. All war industries were to be dismantled. No steps would be taken to rehabilitate the economy except for agriculture production. Pending production limits set by the ACC production of iron steel, chemicals, machine tools, electronic equipment, automobiles, and heavy industry would be stopped. These punitive measures were relaxed under the Potsdam Protocol.

Besides these punitive measures, JCS 1067 would decentralize the German political and administrative structure. It called for the demilitarization and denazification of Germany. It would also allow freedoms of speech, press and religion.

Finally, in November SHAEF issued its own military government directive. The SHAEF Directive gave the military commanders seven CA/MB missions (65:108):

1. Impose the will of the Allies on an occupied Germany.
2. Care for and return Displaced Persons, and provide minimum care to enemy refugees.
3. Apprehend all war criminals.
4. Eliminate Nazism, Fascism, and German militarism.

5. Restore and maintain law and order as far as the military situation permitted.

6. Protect United Nations property and preserve German foreign exchange assets.

7. Set up a suitable administration to implement the preceding six missions.

Initial Civil Affairs/Military Government Procedures.

A typical CA unit employed the following procedures when occupying a German community (65:134). First, SHAEF proclamations and ordinances were posted. However, due to the concern about the wording of some of the proclamations, these were not available until 12 October 1944. Second, the CA officer would locate the Burgermeister or appoint one if the existing Burgermeister could not be found or was clearly a Nazi. Third, security measures were implemented including collecting all weapons, ammunition, radio transmitters, etc. Fourth, procedures were implemented to keep the civilians out of the way of advancing Allied troops.

Of these tasks, controlling the local population was the most time consuming, and considered the most critical. The Allies were not sure how the German people would react to the occupation. Officials at SHAEF expected a hostile population which would engage in resistance. The field experience in the first days was quite the opposite.

The Germans who did not evacuate with the retreating German troops were glad to see the Allies and were very docile and cooperative. This behavior, for some Allied commanders, was too good to be true and they remained suspicious. In fact, some commanders tried to evacuate the entire population from a town (65:135). This was a mistake. First, it was expensive in time, money, and transportation resources. Second, it was a hardship on the local population. Finally, it made the evacuees wards of the Allies. This meant the Allies were directly responsible for the care and feeding of the entire population which was expensive in both time and resources. A better method was to rely on circulation restrictions and curfews to control the population.

Because there was no central policy on controlling civilians, each tactical commander imposed his own requirements. In addition, these requirements would change from commander to commander as different tactical units moved through the same town.

To help control the population, all adults were required to register with the CA officer (65:136). Each adult was issued a registration card. During these early occupation efforts, about one third of the normal population remained rather than to evacuate with the retreating German

Army. This reduced population eased some of the initial problems CA officers faced but exacerbated others.

As German troops withdrew they evacuated most of the civil administration personnel and either destroyed the local records or took the records with them (65:140). This meant the CA officer had to appoint an all new civil administration. The denazification program narrowed the number of potential candidates. However, the greatest difficulty filling these positions was because many candidates had relatives or close friends in Nazi-held Germany, and they feared Nazi reprisal against their relatives and friends if they collaborated with the Allies. There was one bright spot. This area of Germany was predominately Catholic and the retreating German forces had overlooked the local church. Many useful records were available there. In addition, the local priests proved a good source of information on the local population and local politics. As a result of these many constraints, appointments were largely based on the political character of the individual, and not his administrative skills.

Additional problems were due to the lack of policy guidance on the occupation of Germany (65:137). The first problem was that general policy towards Germany was unsettled at the Cabinet level. In addition, there was a lack of published material such as AFM 27-5, SHAEF's

Standard Policy and Procedures paper, and the Handbook for Germany. In this policy vacuum, each CA unit commander and tactical commander implemented their own ideas. These ideas were often contradictory from one commander to the next. For example, one tactical commander ordered all cameras and radios of the German population be held by the Burgermeister. The next commander was not even aware of this order until the Burgermeister came to report Army troops had broken into his house and stolen all the equipment.

As a general rule, the local German population, as a conquered people, were easier to deal with than the liberated people of France and Belgium. There was no single serious act of violence against Allied troops by Germans during this period. In fact, the cordial relationships between the occupying Allied troops and the local Germans caused concern at SHAEF and the 21st Army Group. In addition, unfavorable press played up the "soft" treatment of the Germans. This bad press lead to strict nonfraternization rules. Standard fines were developed. There was a \$10 fine if an Allied person was seen talking to a German in public, a \$25 fine if the person was found in a German house, and a \$65 fine if the person had sexual contact with a German. In the field, this nonfraternization policy was hard to enforce. It also caused a lot of

confusion among the Germans about the intentions of the Allies. The Germans frequently interpreted this Allied aloofness as disdain and they began to mistrust the Allies.

Another breakdown between SHAEF and the field units concerned the rehabilitation of the local economy. For those working in the field, it was hard to ignore the hardships faced by the Germans. Efforts were made to restore local areas to reasonable levels of productivity. For example, the Kries bank at Monschau reopened and during the initial occupation deposits grew and loans were made to keep the local economy running. The very success of this operation caused concern at SHAEF because it appeared to violate SHAEF's policy of not rehabilitating the local economy. In addition, CA officers in field tried to establish barter schemes between occupied communities to level shortages. However, these efforts were also not encouraged by SHAEF.

SHAEF policy on occupation had three main points (65:162). First, Germany was not a "liberated" country but an occupied one. Second, the main thrust of occupation was to eliminate Germany as a military threat - now and for the future. Third, no steps were to be taken to rehabilitate the economy. CA field personnel, while not wanting in any way to impede the war effort, felt that some minimal level

of rehabilitation was necessary to maintain effective control of the local population.

This punitive SHAEF policy caused problems for field CA officers. These problems came to the fore with the occupation of Aachen on 21 October 1944. Aachen was the first German city occupied after a fierce battle. As a result of the battle, over 85% of the town was destroyed, and there were over 14,000 refugees behind the Allied lines. Initially, there was wide spread looting, by both civilians and the military. Maintaining security was a continuing problem. A US Army Field Artillery Battalion was first used to establish order. The long term solution was to rehabilitate the local Aachen police force. Many of the policemen were former Nazis and the rest were inexperienced. However, they were all that was available. Even with the presence of a local police force, looting was a continuing problem as each succeeding group of Allied troops proceeded to loot the area as they passed through.

Restoration of public services also presented unique problems. In spite of the wide-spread destruction, under the rubble most public utilities were relatively undamaged. This was because most of the facilities were modern and buried underground. But these modern high technology facilities carried an unforeseen problem - no one was available who knew how to operate them. All these

problems lead to concerns about the population surviving the winter.

The Battle of the Bulge exacerbated these concerns, and provide the severest test of CA/MG efforts to date. Normally the region was not self-sufficient in food. For example, the area imported 80% of the grain and potatoes it needed. In addition, those areas of Germany which normally exported food to the Aachen region were still under German control. To make matters worse, food shortages were already a problem in the low countries. Finally, the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes meant the feeding of the local population was given a lower priority as most of the Allied effort went to stop the German offensive.

The Battle of the Bulge also had a psychological impact on CA/MG efforts (65:155). Before the counter-offensive, the CA units were about ready to turn over day-to-day administration to the locals and merely supervise their efforts. In addition, the local population had convinced themselves the war was over for them and it was time to pick up pieces and get on with their lives. The counter-offensive changed all that. First, it disrupted CA/MG efforts as Allied troops pulled out of some areas. More importantly, it reminded the Germans that the war was not over and they were not necessarily safe from Nazi reprisals (49:197).

By winter the economy around Aachen was prostrate (65:179). Three fourths of the population was being fed 1000 calories a day from soup kitchens. The Aachen coal mines, which had employed 20,000 before the Allies, now only employed 1000. These 1000 had an absenteeism rate of 33 percent because the food ration was not enough to sustain a hard working man. In addition, wages were no incentive because there was nothing to buy. SHAEF's punitive policy for Germany had ignored the lessons learned in North Africa about the need for food and consumer goods to motivate the civilian population to work for the Allies.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Efforts During the Battle for Rhineland. Following the defeat of the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, the Allies began their advance toward the Rhine River in 1945. On 23 February the 9th Army crossed the Roer River, and the 1st Army crossed the Rhine River at Remagen in the first week of March.

The retreating Germans faced a dilemma (65:185). The Russians were advancing from the east and creating an enormous wave of refugees. Meanwhile, the Allies were advancing from the west. Soon the refugee problem would overwhelm the Germans. The initial solution was to encourage all Germans, except those who had skills which might be helpful to the Allies, to stay at home.

Besides an increasingly larger civilian population to deal with, the Allies faced another new situation as they advanced to the Rhine River - many of the cities were totally destroyed. For example, the city of Juelich, located on the right bank of the Roer River, was completely destroyed. Other cities in the area were also nearly destroyed. In contrast, in Krefeld, located on the Rhine River, over 100,000 people remained in huge concrete air shelters when the Allies arrived.

To deal with this situation of rapidly advancing troops, special CA units, designated as "I" detachments, were used to spearhead CA/MG activities. These I detachments were composed of three or four officers, five enlisted men and two jeeps with trailers. When they arrived at a city they arranged to bury the dead, to restore rations, to put police back on the streets, and where possible to restore electricity and water works. They also cared for DPs, requisitioned billets for the Allied troops, and arranged for labor pools to meet Army needs.

As the troops advanced, the I detachments would proceed to the next town. There they would post the Allied proclamations and ordinances, issue circulation and curfew orders, remove the most obvious Nazis, and appoint an acting Burgermeister. They then moved on to the next town.

By 6 March, the 1st Army was clearing Cologne, the largest city in the Rhineland (65:189). The city was badly damaged by Allied bombings and artillery fire. Over 70 percent of the city was destroyed but the population had survived by adapting to cellar life. The entire population lived in cellars relatively safe from Allied bombing raids and rarely ventured above ground.

One of the biggest CA/MB problems was to rebuild the city administration of Cologne. Not only were Nazis not permitted in the administration but no other cliques were to be fostered as was perceived to be the case in Aachen during the early occupation of that city. Officials had to be anti-Nazi and pro-democracy to be selected. Fortunately, for the Allies, Dr Konrad Adenauer, the former Oberburgermeister of Cologne, was still nearby. The Allies were able to put the seventy year old man in charge of Cologne. From there he went on to be the first Chancellor of Germany in 1949.

Cologne also illustrated the worst conditions CA officers would have to deal with (65:191). Cologne was cut off from its lifelines to the outside. Neither the Germans nor the Allies could get the railroads, the power grid, or the food distribution systems working again. Fortunately, the city contained stocks of food and coal in the cellars and there were 75 wood burning trucks available. These

stocks were sufficient to get the population through the first few months of the occupation.

The city of Trier faced similar problems. One bright spot was that only 4,000 of the normal 88,000 people had remained in Trier. The biggest CA/MB problem was an adequate supply of water. Bombings had damaged the water lines and the lack of electricity meant the water could not be pumped, even if the mains were in working order. It was months before the water system was restored. In the meantime, it looked as if fires would destroy what remained of the city. There were so many fires the Army had to send in a fire fighting platoon to help the local volunteer fire department. It was not until 29 March 1945 that a whole day went by without a fire.

By the end of March a new problem arose - a lack of CA officers. By this time the 9th and 3rd Armies had committed all the CA detachments assigned to them. Overall, 150 detachments were deployed in Germany. This was nearly two thirds the total CA strength. As a result, detachments were holding areas 3 to 4 times the size for which they were staffed. Maintaining order was an increasing problem. The Army had to convert several field artillery battalions to security guard duty in an attempt to maintain order.

Disease and hunger were not yet problems but they were not far away. In March there were still caches of food

available. But the Rhineland was a net importer of food. For example, in the southern region of the Rhineland nearly 500,000 tons of food were normally imported daily. But no trains were running to bring in the food. More important for the long term were the unplowed fields. A shortage of manpower was the major reason. Most of the men under 50 years of age were gone. The bulk of farm laborers used to be slave workers from occupied lands. But, these refugees had left to try to return home. In addition, there was a lack of farm animals, specifically horses. Fortunately, as the German army retreated across the Rhine River it was not able to get all its horses across. Consequently, the Army rounded up these horses, which numbered several thousand, and turned them over to the German farmers. Finally, in anticipation of food shortages, 80,000 tons of relief supplies were moved into Germany.

The spread of contagious diseases was a problem. The spread of typhus to Allied troops was the biggest concern. The major source of the disease was former German prisoners. To meet this threat, SHAEF began shipping enough vaccine to inoculate all DPs. In addition, no persons were allowed to cross from Germany into the Netherlands, France, or Switzerland without a medical examination and a DDT dusting.

It was during the battle for the Rhineland that DPs first became a serious CA/MG problem (65:200). By the end

of March there were 145,000 DPs in Allied camps and another 45,000 enroute to their homelands. SHAEF had not planned on this number of DPs. To make matters worse, SHAEF planners had thought DPs on farms would remain there for several weeks because of the dependable food supply. This was not the case. They left the farms as quickly as the others left the towns. This presented a two-fold problem. First, it increased the number of DPs needing care. Second, it removed most of the agricultural labor from German farms. In an attempt to relieve the congestion at the DP camps, western European DPs were quickly processed and sent on to their homelands. Eastern Europeans were another matter. The borders were closed to them. This created a long-term problem for the Allies which had not been foreseen.

SHAEF's policy was to provide food, shelter, and medical care to the DPs at the expense of the Germans (65:203). For example, DPs received 2,000 calories per day while the German population received about 1,100 calories. In March, SHAEF tried to turn the DPs over to UNRRA but only seven teams arrived. While the UNRRA would provide considerable help in this area, the Army was never able to turn over the DP problem completely to the UNRRA.

Civil Affairs/Military Government Efforts During the Drive to the Elbe. By the end of March all Allied armies had crossed the Rhine River. Rather than attack the heavily

manned Ruhr area, Eisenhower decided to encircle the area and proceed east. German POWs were beginning to cause CA/MG problems. The battle for the Rhineland had netted about 250,000 POWs (60:358). As the German Army disintegrated before the advancing Allies, the number of POWs increased dramatically.

SHAEF planning for POWs was inadequate to deal with the actual flood of POWs (65:241). SHAEF planning estimates were for 900,000 POWs by the end of June. By mid-April there were 1.3 million POWs with 600,000 more expected by the end of the month and another 600,000 in May. Technically, POWs are entitled to the same rations as their Allied counterpart. SHAEF never intended to comply with this requirement but the large number of POWs still diverted more resources to POWs than had been planned.

The advance across Germany towards the Elbe River created a host of new CA/MG problems besides the POW problem. Among them was a dramatic increase in DPs and German refugees, the discovery of the bank reserves of the Reichbank at Markers, and the shocking discovery of the Nazi concentration camps.

In the second week of April the DP problem reached a crisis point (65:239). The Germans, who had been herding most of the DPs with them as they retreated, literally ran out of room. They began releasing the DPs into Allied

territory. By the middle of April, 1,000,000 DP's were in Allied hands. By the end of April the number was 2 million (8:25). The 9th Army and the 1st Army formed 59 DP teams, along with 43 UNRRA teams, to deal with the DP's flooding into the American zone. The 9th Army issued 200,000 rations a day to DP's and the 1st Army 1 million per week. At first the food came from captured stocks but the 1st Army also requisitioned 20,000 tons of imported relief supplies.

Besides feeding the DP's, controlling their movements was a major problem. To avoid clogging the roads, the DP's were directed into camps where they could be processed and transportation arranged for them. As was the case in the Rhineland, western European DP's were processed as fast as possible and shipped back to their homelands as soon as transportation could be found. More than 5,000 DP's were shipped per day.

Looting by the DP's was another CA/MB problem. First, many of the DP's, once free of the German yoke, proceeded to exact revenge. They also felt that Germany was a conquered nation and property was free for the taking. In addition, many of the DP's refused to go to the camps and lived off the land by looting.

As the Allies neared the Elbe River, they faced a great mass of German refugees fleeing the on-coming Russian Armies. For example, as the 3rd Army crossed the border

into Czechoslovakia in the end of April, they meet 250,000 Silesian German refugees.

The discovery of the gold reserves at Merkers illustrated a unexpected phenomenon in war-torn Germany. As the Allied bombing campaigns intensified, the German government had dispersed its operations throughout Germany. At Merkers a remarkable treasure was uncovered. The find included 250 tons of gold, currency for every European country, and over 400 tons of art works. In addition, bank records uncovered at Merkers lead the way to other treasure caches. The logistics of safe guarding and moving such treasures was a unique experience for CA officers.

But the worst CA/MB problem still awaited the Allies - the Nazi concentration camps. The first concentration camp reached by the US was at Ohrdruf-Nord, which was a work camp for the Buchenwald concentration camp (65:231). Eisenhower's policy of dealing with the camps was to force the leaders of near-by towns to visit the camps and have the Germany civilians bury the dead. At Buchenwald over 50,000 had died at a rate of 200 per day. Sadly, Buchenwald was not the worst. At the extermination camps like Auschwitz up to 12,000 human beings were exterminated every day by the Nazis (60:198).

The treatment of the survivors of the concentration camps was a particularly trying job for CA officers. In

spite of their best efforts, thousands died every day, either too far gone with hunger and disease, or tragically having lost the last bit of will to live. The US brought in hospitals and medical supplies on a massive scale to aid these victims.

By the time the US reached Dauchau on 29 April, CA officials were prepared (65:252-3). The CA officers arrived with three trucks of food and medical supplies. By the third day two 400 bed hospitals had arrived. Rations were immediately raised from 600 calories per day under the Germans to 1,200. Within two weeks the ration was 2,400 calories. Even so, thousands died after the arrival of the US.

On 8 May 1945, the surrender of Germany was official. CA/MB efforts now turned from controlling the local population in order to further military objectives, to one of governing a defeated enemy.

V. US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government:
Post-War Occupation of Germany

Introduction

On 7 May 1945, the Germans signed an unconditional surrender with the Western Allies. However, Stalin would not recognize this surrender and the signing was repeated for his benefit in Berlin just before midnight on 8 May 1945 (53:490-3).

The signing of the surrender document in Berlin was just one in a long line of Allied documents concerning Germany. The first document was the Atlantic Charter issued by Roosevelt and Churchill on 14 August 1941. This charter called for the destruction of Nazi tyranny and the reestablishment of a peaceful, united German nation.

At the Casablanca Conference (January 1943), Roosevelt enunciated the policy of unconditional surrender and total war against Germany. At the second Quebec Conference, 11-16 September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed the British would control the northwestern part of Germany and the US the southern part (50:511). The Russians would control an unspecified eastern portion of Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill also initialed the Morgenthau Plan for Germany at the second Quebec Conference.

The Morgenthau Plan was put forward by Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau after he reviewed a draft of SHAEF's

Handbook for Germany. Morgenthau felt the Handbook's treatment of Germany was too lenient and he pushed for a harder line against Germany. Because the Allies had not yet reached any agreements on how Germany would be treated and the War Department did not have any firm plans, Morgenthau was able step into this policy vacuum with his own proposal (3:64-5). Also, neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of War attended the second Quebec Conference. Thus, Morgenthau was able to champion his cause before Roosevelt without any opposition from the other two Secretaries.

The thrust of Morgenthau's plan was punitive. He wanted to teach Germany a lesson. His plan called for reducing the size of Germany by ceding borderlands to its neighbors (3:71-2). His plan would also divide the rest of Germany into three parts - a northern part, a southern part, and the Ruhr. The industrial Ruhr would be under international control. Industrial plants in all three areas would be dismantled or destroyed. The goal was to turn Germany into an agrarian society.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to the plan at Quebec. However, when the details of this plan were published US public reaction was violently against the plan (3:76). In addition, German propaganda had a field day using the draconian measures of the plan to rally the German people

against the Allies. Consequently, Roosevelt quietly dropped his support for the plan, but not before a large portion of the plan made its way into JCS Directive 1067. JCS 1067, issued in April 1945, was the initial War Department guidance on a US military government for Germany (54:76).

At Yalta, 3 to 11 February 1945, the Western Allies met with Stalin. They agreed the three powers would each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Control over Germany as a whole would be through a central Control Council composed of the theater Commanders of the three powers. This Allied Control Council (ACC) would be headquartered in Berlin. At this time, Stalin agreed the French could participate in the occupation, if they desired, provided France's territory came from the US and British sectors.

At Yalta the Allies also formulated their basic policy toward Germany after the surrender. They agreed to destroy Nazism and German militarism. They also agreed to disarm and disband the German military, to eliminate war industries, to punish war criminals, to exact reparations, and to remove all Nazi and military influences from German life. Yalta also recognized the annexation of Polish territory by the Russians and the offsetting annexation by Poland of the eastern lands of Germany. These decisions at Yalta, plus elements of the Morgenthau plan, formed the basis of JCS Directive 1067 (3:80).

Prior to Yalta, the European Advisory Committee (EAC) had met to reach agreements on the control of Germany. They developed three documents plus a map. The map dealt with the boundaries of the German occupation zones including a French zone and also covered the division of Berlin among the Allies.

The first document was the terms of surrender which Germany signed in Berlin on 8 May 1945 (23:11). This document specified the unconditional surrender of Germany and the supreme authority of the Allies over Germany. It reiterated the division of Germany into four zones and covered the general terms of surrender. The second document established the Allied Commander of each zone as supreme authority in that zone. The only restraint on that Commander's authority was the unanimous decision of the ACC. This requirement for unanimous consent before any German-wide directive could be issued proved unworkable. Either the Russians or the French blocked most attempts to establish unified policies for Germany. The third document, while guaranteeing Allied presence in Berlin, did not address directly the question of direct access to Berlin. This oversight was to lead to the Berlin crisis in 1948.

Basis of these conferences and direct inputs from Roosevelt, the JCS developed the US guidance for the US occupation of Germany. Its guidance was issued in a top

secret document known as JCS 1067 (54:76). This directive specified that Germany was to be occupied as a defeated nation and discouraged fraternization between US troops and the German people. It also provided for severe economic restrictions. For example, the German economy was to be developed only to extent necessary to prevent disease and unrest. The directive also dealt with denazification and the disbanding of the German armed forces. It also called for the dismantling of all war industries and the break up of economic power through the elimination of cartels. Reparations were to be made from existing German industrial plants. Industrial production was limited to a fixed percentage of 1936 production. These draconian measures were somewhat relaxed in the Potsdam Protocol of 17 July to 2 August 1945.

According to General Lucius D. Clay, the Potsdam Protocol was the single most important document dealing with the German problem (12:39). Unfortunately, France was not a signatory to the Protocol. Because the French would not recognize the Potsdam Protocol, it never became the rule of law for the ACC as was intended.

In general, the protocol reaffirmed the Yalta Declaration. It reasserted the supreme authority of the four commanders-in-chief, acting in unanimous consent for the whole of Germany, and acting separately in each zone of

occupation. It called for complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. German industry, having a major war potential, would be eliminated. It also called for the denazification of Germany and the swift trial of all war criminals.

To encourage democratic growth, the German education system was to be controlled and the judicial system reorganized. Political control was to be decentralized. Elective councils were to be established first at the local level and then at the regional, provincial, and state levels as practical. However, the national government was limited to essential administrative agencies under the immediate supervision of the ACC. But, the ACC was never able to establish these administrative agencies. This failure was one of the reasons for the slow rehabilitation of the German economy. It also led to the demise of the ACC in early 1948.

The Protocol called for treating Germany as a single economic unit. The failure of the ACC meant the economic unification of Germany did not occur until unification began in 1990. But, more importantly, the financial and economic provisions of Potsdam negated many of the punitive economic provisions in JCS 1067. Potsdam economic and financial provisions included (12:41):

- (1) Production of war equipment was prohibited.

(2) Production from industries which could support war production was limited to peacetime needs.

(3) Excessive concentration of economic power was to be broken up and cartels disbanded.

(4) Production of agricultural goods and domestic goods was to be maximized.

(5) Policies common to all zones were to be established for mining and production, wage and price controls, rationing, imports and exports, currency and banking, central taxation, reparations, transportation, and communications.

(6) Ensure an equitable distribution of essential goods among the four zones.

(7) Reparations were to leave enough resources in Germany to enable it to be self-sufficient.

In sum, the Potsdam Protocol charged the military governors to develop a balanced German peace economy which would be self-sustaining.

Military Government Structure for Germany

Allied Control Council. Each zone was under the exclusive control of the occupying nation. However, it was recognized that for economic matters and public utilities Germany would be run as a single entity. The Allied Control Council was established to develop these unified policies.

Negotiations with the Soviets over administrative issues delayed the opening of the ACC until 30 July 1945 (12:33).

On 10 August, the ACC approved its organizational structure. It also agreed to meet three times per month. Between ACC meetings the Deputy Military Governors met as an informal coordinating committee to prepare the agenda for the next ACC meeting. The ACC staff organization included directorates for the following areas: Military, Naval, and Air; Transport; Economic; Finance; Political; Reparations; Deliveries and Restitution; Legal; Internal Affairs and Communications; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Manpower; and, German External Property.

Between July 1945 and March 1948, the ACC met to discuss and resolve issues common to all four zones. Agreements on level of industry production, currency reform, reparations, and other CA/MG logistical issues were slow in occurring. The inability of the ACC to resolve these basic issues meant the German economy stagnated for several years. In addition, the divisiveness of the ACC, especially between the US and Russia, marked the start of the cold war. The ultimate result was the Russian blockade of Berlin in 1948 and the separation of Germany into two countries in 1949.

Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS). OMGUS was set up by the US to administer the US zone of occupied Germany. It remained the US

military government organization in Germany until 1949. In 1949 OMGUS was replaced by the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). HICOG was headed by a civilian and lasted until 1955.

OMGUS had a dual responsibility. First, it represented the US on the ACC. Second, it supervised the military government activities in the US zone. Its headquarters was in Berlin. Overall, OMGUS had about 12,000 officers and enlisted men. This was considerable fewer than the 25,000 administering the British zone. This lower manning level resulted from the US placing greater reliance on German staffs than did either the British or the French.

OMGUS was a military organization. The Military Governor was always an Army General. There was a substantial civilian staff, but military officers coordinated on all actions. The organizational structure of OMGUS evolved over time. The essential elements included a Military Governor, who was also the theater commander. The Military Governor was assisted in daily matters by a Deputy Military Governor and a Chief of Staff. Under the Chief of Staff were functional divisions for such activities as economics, finance, transportation, manpower, POWs and DPs. Later, offices to handle governmental affairs, education, and cultural relations were added.

Below OMBUS were the regional military governments. There were regional governments for Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, and Bremen. Each of these regional governments was headed by the regional Army Commander. The chain of command between OMBUS and these regional units was quite tortuous. Field units would send requests to the local tactical commander, who would forward the request to the Army Division. Division would send it to Corps, who sent it to Army Group, who, in turn, forwarded it to OMBUS. This arrangement did not last long. In the end, the chain was streamlined from OMBUS to Land (states) military governments to field units.

Military Government Logistics Efforts in Germany

Introduction. After the war Germany lay in ruins (3:230). Twenty percent of all housing was destroyed and another 20 percent was uninhabitable. These figures were even higher in the larger cities. For example, in Cologne and Hamburg between 50 and 75 percent of all housing was destroyed or uninhabitable. In addition factories and production facilities were gutted.

Over 7.5 million Germans were homeless and an additional 8 million had been expelled from Sudetenland, East Prussia, etc. These refugees were sent to occupied Germany. Also, around 2 million Germans were leaving the Soviet zone for the US and British zones. In addition, the

loss of East Prussia and Silesia meant Germany had lost its most productive farm land. Before the war Germany had produced 85% of the food it needed. Now it would have less agricultural land and more people. Against this rather bleak picture was superimposed the draconian measures of JCS 1067, extensive reparations to Russia, and the failure of the ACC to develop a coherent unified economic policy for all of Germany.

The combined effect of these factors was a prescription for disaster. Food production dropped to 25% of requirements. The population subsisted on less than 1200 calories per day. The level of industry plan for 1946 limited German production to 1932 levels: a depression year in which 50% of the German population was unemployed. Germany was unable to export goods and, consequently, had no hard currency to import needed food and raw materials. As a result of the raw material shortages, a malnourished population, and a general lack of incentives to produce goods, industrial production lagged. By May 1946 industrial production was only 33% of 1936 levels in the British sector and 46% in the US sector. This caused a massive subsidy of the German economy by the US and Britain just to keep Germany from the brink of disaster. Between 1945 and 1947 the US and Britain spent about \$1 billion per year just to sustain life in Germany. In addition, the shortage of goods

had lead to black market operations on a monumental scale. It was estimated that up to 50% of all transactions were on the black market. Most of the rest of business was conducted on the barter system.

US logistics policies and efforts that lead to state of affairs are discussed below. How the US reversed its policy and contributed to the miraculous recovery of the Germany economy is also reviewed.

Civilian Supplies. During the first year of occupation the most critical need was food. Immediately following the war the German population was well fed thanks to the importation of food from conquered countries but with its defeat this food source disappeared. However, Allied planners felt food would not be a problem. This assessment was based on the fact that prior to the war Germany produced 85% of its food requirements. In addition, they planned a diet of 2000 calories which was below prewar German levels. This combination of nearly meeting food requirements in the past and the lowered calorie intake during the occupation meant to the planners food would not be a problem.

This planning, of course, did not take into account recent events. For example, the loss of the eastern agricultural areas to Poland and Russia was not considered. The forced removal of 8 million Germans from other territories to occupied Germany was not taken into account.

Nor was the fact Hitler had reorganized the German economy during the war away from agricultural production to favor industrial production. In addition, under Hitler, agricultural workers came from conquered countries - a labor source no longer available. The planners also failed to account for fertilizer supplies such as nitrogen and phosphate where production had been diverted to munitions. Finally, the Allies started out with a hard-hearted attitude towards feeding the Germans. For example, Roosevelt felt the Germans could be fed by soup lines if necessary (52:467).

This general disregard of the food problem meant the Allies were unprepared to deal with food shortages when they arose in the fall-winter of 1945. Once the emergency was recognized, 630,000 tons of wheat were released to the Army to prevent mass starvation in the US, British, and French sectors. A daily ration of 950-1150 calories was established. However, only 950 calories could be provided. The fall harvests were expected to ease this situation and plans were made for rations of 1550 calories per day after the harvest of 1945. Even with the harvest, 4 million tons of foodstuffs for Germany were needed to reach the goal of 2000 calorie diet. Unfortunately, there was a world-wide food shortage during the winter of 1945-6 and this level of foodstuffs was not available. To make matters worse, the

harvest was not as large as anticipated. As a result, by May 1946 the daily ration for Germany was 1180 calories.

The harvest of 1946 was average. This, plus a slight increase in imports, allowed a ration of 1550 calories. However, this ration was short-lived. In January 1947 the British and US zones were combined. The British zone, consisting mainly of industrial areas such as Ruhr, was even more short of food than the US zone. Consequently, rations dropped to 1040 calories by April 1947. A drought in the summer of 1947 reduced the harvest by about 20% and threats of malnutrition were raised anew. Increased food imports allowed rations to be raised to 1550 by April 1948. A good harvest world-wide in 1948 finally broke the food shortage problem. The daily ration was increased to 1990 calories in July 1948 and by 1950 food rationing was dropped.

During this bleak period, the population engaged in massive scrounging activities to supplement their diets. The black market in food also supplemented the diet of the Germans. However, General Clay estimated these activities only added about 200 calories per day to the local diet.

Beside the humanitarian aspect of the food shortages, there were implications for other areas of MG logistics. First, the low diet meant a less productive work force. Second, the low diet meant a substantial increase in health problems. And third, the need to scrounge for food diverted

significant labor away from productive work. At the height of the food crisis about 20% of a worker's time was diverted from productive work to scavenging.

Public Health. At the end of the war the German people were in relatively good health. However, the mass upheaval of people and the food crisis created enormous health problems the Allies were not prepared to deal with.

According to General Clay:

Bombed and partially destroyed cities, damaged water supplies, crowded dwellings, and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, refugees, and expellees leaving and arriving daily, created the conditions in which epidemics develop. (12:272)

The initial public health surveys indicated a shortage of hospital facilities and medical supplies. Efforts were undertaken to reopen pharmaceutical plants and repair hospitals. These efforts were hampered by efforts to denazify the public health and medical organizations. By October 1945, Germany only had one half of the hospital bed space it required.

Contagious diseases such as diphtheria, tuberculosis, and typhoid increased. Efforts were made to inoculate the population where appropriate. Water systems were repaired and water chlorinated. Venereal disease (VD) was also a serious problem. It wasn't until the spring of 1947 that enough penicillin was available to start a vigorous campaign

against VD. DDT was effectively used to delouse refugees and prevent outbreaks of typhus.

Effects of malnutrition were also closely monitored. One program called for the periodic weighing of a random sample of the population. This weighing program showed a population weighing 3 to 14 percent below standard weights for a given sex and age. In addition, nutritional teams were set up to operate in those areas where they were needed most.

By January 1946 the German public health organizations were reorganized and began to assume control of public health programs at the local level. MG personnel were still used at the state level. It was not until 1948 that state public health departments were in German hands. By then most hospitals had been repaired, medical supplies were adequate, and increased food supplies were overcoming the problems of malnutrition.

The mixed results of US public health efforts are seen in the birth and death statistics for the fourth quarter of 1947. During this time, the birth rate was 16.3 per 1000 population (versus 24.6 in US) and the death rate was 15.4 per 1000 population (versus 11.1 in US).

Economic and Financial Issues.

Reparations. Starting at Yalta, Stalin insisted on a substantial level of reparations from Germany to cover

the massive damage Russia experienced during the war (11:81-2). Stalin wanted total reparations of \$20 billion from Germany. Of this \$20 billion, \$10 billion would go to the Russians. Britain and US agreed with the principle of reparations but disagreed on the level. The matter was referred to a special committee to resolve at Potsdam.

The Allies did agree at Potsdam that Russian reparations would come from east Germany, plus an additional 25 percent from western Germany. In exchange, the Russians would send other commodities of the equivalent of 60 percent of the value of the equipment they received to the other three zones. This was an effort to ensure an equitable distribution of resources among the four zones.

The US position on reparations was that they would come from German production. The US also felt that reparations were tied to a balanced import-export program and an economically unified Germany. The lack of Russian cooperation on import-exports, level of industry, and economic unification lead the US to cease all reparations to Russia in March 1946.

Dismantling. A major element of the reparations program was the dismantling of key industries and the shipment of the equipment to European countries as reparations. The US declined to participate in the receipt of dismantled equipment. Deteriorating relations with the

Russians led to the suspension of the program in March 1946. But, at the Moscow conference in early 1947 a new plan for dismantling was developed. This plan called for the dismantling of 682 plants in Bizonia (the joint US-British zone) and 172 in the French Zone.

An example of the dismantling program was in Marburg (32:122-3). The German ammunition factory near Marburg was scheduled for dismantling. While the equipment was removed, the buildings were not destroyed as planned. Instead, the buildings were kept and were used to house a variety of industries including a soap factory, a glass warehouse, and a factory that manufactured office equipment. Despite these positive uses of the old ammunition buildings, the population of Marburg perceived the dismantling program as designed to reduce their standard of living and not just to eliminate Germany's war-making potential. CA officers were never able to overcome this negative impression.

Public opinion in the US became increasing in favor of halting the dismantling program. The US public viewed the program as unwarranted and harmful. As the result of the Petersburg Protocol in 1950, the dismantling program came to a halt.

There were several difficulties with the dismantling program where it was implemented. First, it was time consuming and expensive to dismantle the equipment and

reassemble it elsewhere. Second, reassembling the plants proved more difficult than anticipated. Third, frequently the plants could not be effectively operated because of the lack of trained workers. On the whole it was found that receiving reparations in the form of manufactured goods was more effective than dismantling plants.

Production Limitations. The Potsdam Agreement had fixed the maximum German production as 55 percent of output in 1938 after adjusting for war output. In addition, certain industries such as aircraft, ball bearings, arms and ammunition, synthetic ammonia, synthetic gasoline and oil, and synthetic rubber were prohibited completely. Certain key industries were cut back sharply. For example, steel was limited to about 30 percent of prewar levels, Chemicals to 40 of 1938 levels, and machine tools to 10 percent. Even farm machinery was limited to 75 percent of prewar rate.

In 1946 industry levels were readjusted effective in 1947. Basically, the new level of industry plan liberalized production levels by allowing them to match 1936 levels (31:152-3). This, for example, allowed steel production to increase from 5.8 million tons to 10.7 million tons. It also increased steel capacity to 13 million tons. Even though this was a liberalization of production limits, it should be remembered that 1936 was a depression year for Germany with over 50 percent of its people unemployed. The

German economy could not fully recover under such restrictive production levels. Pressure was building from other countries for increased production by Germany (38:387). They wanted German imports and needed to export their goods to Germany if their own economies were to expand. By 1949 most industry level restrictions were eliminated although certain restrictions on potential war industries such as aircraft and ship building remained.

Imports/Exports. Even considering the effects of reparations, dismantling of war industries, and production limitations, the lack of raw materials was the main bottleneck for expanding German industrial production. With raw materials Germany was unable to produce goods for export. Without exports Germany was unable to import food and raw materials - a vicious cycle.

The real failure of US Military Government policy in this area was the lack of funds to buy the raw materials necessary to prime the pump of Germany industry. General Draper estimated it would take about \$1 billion to finance the purchase of the necessary raw materials (12:196). Until the Marshall Plan in 1948 no money was available for purchasing raw materials.

Without the funds to prime the pump, the only strategy available to OMGUS was to exchange importation of raw materials for production of German goods. This bootstrap

approach was very slow. To complicate matters Germany had no foreign exchange to buy imports. Thus, the currency for exchange would have to be dollars. But the other European countries did not want to sell raw materials to Germany using dollars and they did not want to buy German goods for dollars either. As a result, exports were far below prewar levels. For example, in 1946 exports from the US zone were \$28 million, of which \$24.5 million was raw goods. These exports were only 5% of the exports from the zone prior to the war (4:123). By contrast, imports into the US zone between 1 August 1945 and 13 December 1946 was about \$335 million, consisting mostly of food, seed, and chemical fertilizers.

The solution was to import "self-liquidating" goods, that is goods which could be transformed into finished goods which would yield exports worth many times the import value of the raw materials. The prime case of "self-liquidating imports" was the importation of raw cotton (4:124). DMGBUS had negotiated with the US Commodity Credit Corporation to import 50,000 tons of raw cotton worth about \$30 million. These imports would be paid for from the proceeds received from exporting the finished cotton goods. It was expected finished goods from 30,000 tons would finance the importation of the 50,000 tons of raw cotton for a net gain to the German economy of 20,000 tons of finished textile

goods. However, the price of the cotton was high, the interest rates were high, and the quality of the cotton was poor. Even so, General Clay felt the cotton allowed the revival of the textile industry and provided a much needed psychological lift to the rest of the country.

With the creation of a joint US-Britain sector, the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) was formed (12:199-200). It was given \$90 million of its \$123 million of capital immediately. This Agency then directed the export and import of goods not only between the two zones, but outside the country. Under this agency exports increased from \$160 million in 1946 (prior to JEIA) to \$225 million in 1947 and \$600 million in 1948. Clearly, the bootstrap effort was beginning to pay off. The last piece in the German economic recovery puzzle was currency reform.

Currency Reform. By the end of the war, the German Reichsmark (RM) was virtually worthless. International markets would not trade the Reichsmark. This was not surprising. During the war Hitler had increased the amount of currency in circulation from 5 billion to 50 billion RM. This ten fold increase in money supply was only accompanied by a 5 fold increase in savings. Meanwhile, Nazi debt had increased over 25 fold. At the same time, real wealth in Germany had decreased by one third (4:91). The result was too many marks chasing too few goods - in

other words, inflation. Hitler had kept inflation in check by rationing necessities and using the Gestapo to enforce by death the rules prohibiting hoarding and black markets.

When the Allies took over Germany, the need for currency reform was painfully obvious. The Allies were not able to provide an adequate level of rationed goods. They also lacked a Gestapo to enforce their rationing system. As a result, the black market flourished. In addition, commerce virtually ceased as firms were wary of being caught holding Reichsmarks which would soon be devalued by 90 percent. Consequently, most commercial transactions were done on the barter system and then recorded on the books as cash transactions based on the prices set by OMGUS.

Thus, the Allies were faced with a situation where the RM had no value in the international market and fears of substantial devaluing made it worthless for internal transactions as well. General Clay established a committee to study the problem. It recommended several actions. The first was to issue a new currency, the Deutsche Mark (DM) and exchange it with the Reichsmark at a ratio of 1 DM to 10 RM. The next step was to impose a 50% mortgage on all real property to reduce the disparity in wealth caused by the devaluation of the mark. The third step was a progressive tax on German wealth. The exchange rate for the DM would be

set at 4 DM for \$1 (4:92-3). General Clay brought this plan before the ACC.

Currency reform was one of the first topics of discussion by the ACC. However, France and Russia continually blocked all efforts to solve this problem. Only in March 1948, after the break-up of the ACC, did the three western powers agree to a currency reform which was implemented on June 20, 1948 - two years after it was first proposed by the US.

For many observers, including Ludwig Erhard, the Minister for Economic Affairs for West Germany, currency reform was the last piece in the puzzle for German economic revival (21:13 and 22:28-9). All that was needed now was the resources to ignite the economy. The European Recovery Program (better known as the Marshall Plan) provided that spark.

Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was first publicized in a speech by Secretary of State Marshall on 5 June 1947 at Harvard University (61:237). In April 1948, Congress approved a total of \$17 billion for the Plan. The European countries formed the Organization for European Economic cooperation (OEEC) to help execute the Marshall plan.

An agreement was signed in mid-1948 which made the combined US-British zones eligible for ECA aid (66:261-3).

Germany was also included as a member of the OEEC, the first international organization Germany was permitted to join since the war. Germany would not receive outright grants like other European countries. Rather, it would only receive loans. The initial requests of the Allied MG was for \$500 million. This was turned down and a tentative sum of \$364 million was established. In September 1948 this amount was increased to \$414 million. It was December 1948 before all arrangements were made. Between 1948 and 1955 (the end of occupation) about \$1.4 billion dollars were provided to Germany under ECA and MSA, the follow up program.

The combined result of MG policies and German efforts was an economy which went from an industrial production rate of 2% in May 1945 to one producing at 173% ten years later. But, this was only the start of the German recovery. Between 1948 and 1964 industrial production increased six fold (61:222).

Public Works. At the end of the war, transportation, communications, and public utilities were in disarray. The communications system proved the easiest to restore, partly because its restoration was essential for Allied operations. Transportation problems were a major bottleneck in reviving the German economy because of the enormous damage from the US strategic bombing campaign. Restoration of public

utilities was hampered primarily by the lack of raw materials such as coal to operate utilities and spare parts to repair damaged facilities.

Communications. The restoration of communications services is one of the MG logistics success stories. By April 1945 postal deliveries within the US zone were restored and by October ACC agreements were in place for interzonal exchange of mail. In April 1946, international mail service was reopened and in June international parcels into Germany were permitted.

Restoration of telegraph and telephone service was also quick. By the fall of 1945, state administrations were given limited jurisdiction over their communications systems. A unified communications system was restored in the US zone by early 1946. In March 1947, the US and British communications networks were integrated. In the Spring international services were restored.

The success of this effort can be seen by the volume of traffic carried. By 1947 mail levels exceeded prewar levels and telephone traffic was twice prewar levels. The Deutsche Post was operating in the black and its international services were generating \$15 million in import credits each year.

Transportation. The Strategic Bombing Surveys conducted after the war generally concluded that strategic

bombing was not successful, except for one area - transportation. The transportation system in Germany was in ruins. The northern ports of Hamburg, Emden, and Bremen were badly damaged. The Rhine River network was closed to navigation thanks to destroyed bridges, locks, and sunken vessels. Germany's railroad system was also paralyzed. Marshaling yards were badly damaged, railroad bridges were destroyed, and most locomotives and rail cars were damaged or destroyed. For example, in the US zone only one third of the locomotives were serviceable and over 20 percent of the main rail trackage was damaged. In addition, less than one fourth of the barges were still serviceable.

By the end of 1945 all main-line trackage was restored to use but at a much lower level of service due to many temporary one-way bridges. In addition, the US Army transferred 25,000 US owned rail cars to German authorities. By April 1946 the Rhine was open to navigation, but a lack of barges was still a problem. Efforts to open the ports were generally successful, though at reduced port capacities. Main highways were useable by the spring of 1946 and the US Army gave the Germans 12,500 Army trucks.

In spite of these efforts, in 1946 only 35% of the locomotives, 43% of the passenger cars, and 58% of the freight cars were usable. This was not sufficient to meet the transportation needs for relief efforts. Only through

water transportation were relief supplies distributed in quantity. Transportation was so short that without 30 US Army truck companies helping much of the grain and potato harvests would have spoiled in the fields.

The severe winter of 1946-1947 and the drought of 1947 played havoc with transportation; especially water transportation. As a result, freight movements were severely restricted and closely regulated. Freight was generally limited to food, fuel, and military supplies. This, of course, made the raw materials shortage even more critical for industry.

By mid-1948 the transportation infrastructure was sufficiently restored to meet all essential needs. In addition, the industrial base was in place to meet the growing transportation needs of Germany stimulated by currency reform in 1948.

Because Germany was prohibited from having any civil aviation, international carriers had to take up the slack. This they did by providing international service between international terminals in Germany and the rest of the world. They also provided feeder service among the international terminals in Germany. This prohibition of civil aviation, was part of the policy of demilitarizing Germany. However, the result was to divert badly needed

import credits out of the Germany economy and increase its exports.

Utilities. As noted above there were two major bottlenecks to reviving German industry - raw materials and power. The shortage of power production can, in large measure, be traced to the shortage of coal production and the Allied policy on how coal was distributed. It wasn't until 1949 that coal would cease to be a bottleneck and was replaced by lack of electric generating capacity as the bottleneck in power production.

The first problem in coal production was the food shortage. When food rations were cut for miners in early 1946 production fell from 180,000 tons per day to 160,000 tons per day. The lack of labor was also a problem. With increasing food rations and number of workers, production increased to 200,000 tons per day. However, even this level was only 50% of 1936 levels.

Adding to the shortage of coal production was the need to export a substantial portion of coal to neighboring countries who were also short of fuel. Exporting coal meant less was available for German industry which, in turn, meant German industry could not produce the equipment needed to repair and modernize coal mining and distribution facilities. In addition, the lack of consumer goods meant there were few incentives for coal worker to increase

production. But, more consumer goods could only be made available if more coal went to German industries.

As a temporary solution to this problem, special incentives were introduced to encourage increased production. These incentives worked until they were met and then production fell unless new incentives were introduced. For example, thanks to incentive programs coal production reached a high of 280,000 tons per day. These incentives consisted mainly of additional Army K and C rations plus surplus clothing. However, once the incentives were earned production dropped back to 260,000 tons per day.

In addition to worker incentives, efforts were made to rehabilitate mining equipment and to improve mining conditions. Finally, in 1947 the neighboring countries agreed to a sliding scale for coal exports based on production levels. Instead of exporting a fixed quantity of coal, coal exports were a function of how much coal was produced. As a result, by March 1949 coal production was 330,000 tons per day or 86% of 1936 levels.

Summary. US military government in Germany started with the initial occupation of Germany in September 1944 and ended in June 1949. During that time there was a remarkable transformation in attitude about the post-war treatment of Germany. The early occupation policy was one of nonfraternization and avoidance of efforts to rehabilitate

the economy. At the end of military occupation, a strong Germany was seen as the key to a central Europe free from communism.

The stage had also been set for the remarkable transformation of the German economy that was to occur in the 1950s and 1960s. By 1949 production was up, exports were expanding, currency reform was a reality, and the population had plenty of food and a growing supply of consumer goods. This transformation could have occurred sooner and with less suffering if policies on currency reform, increased production levels, and increased export had been implemented sooner. The fact is these policy were eventually adopted and in the end CA/MG logistics in Germany was successful.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

Introduction

This thesis examined some of the US logistics efforts under CA/MG during World War II and immediately following the war. It looked at our efforts in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. Logistics lessons learned from these efforts are developed below and related to current CA/MG planning and training efforts.

Answers to Investigative Questions

Research Question 1. What was the planning for CA/MG prior to and during World War II? Were the plans followed and were they effective?

Many times prior to World War II the US was involved in CA/MG activities. However, these activities were never planned. They were in reaction to whatever was the current situation. For example, in spite of our many and repeated involvements in the Caribbean (Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Cuba), we never developed policies covering the objectives or methods for CA/MG for that area.

The lack of a coherent centralized policy for CA/MG efforts means these efforts are rarely successful. If you don't know what the goal is, it is hard to achieve it. The occupation of the South during and after the Civil War is a case in point. The US did not have a national policy

pertaining to the occupation of the South. Consequently, the occupation was greatly influenced by the mood of the country which in this case was generally one of retribution. This policy of retribution did little to bring the southern states back into the Union.

The lack of defined procedures for CA/MG activities hampered our early efforts. For example, General Taylor in the Mexican War had no procedures for CA/MG activities. As a result, his men were free to do as they pleased. Many cases of atrocities against the Mexican people were the result. General Scott, who replaced General Taylor, developed detailed procedures covering the conduct of his men and the Mexicans under his control. The result was law and order and a successful invasion of Mexico, unhampered by opposition from the local Mexicans.

Prior to World War II, military men were not trained in CA/MG activities. This lack of training meant the same mistakes were made time after time. The lack of trained CA/MG officers blunted the value of these activities for tactical commanders. For example, during the Civil War the occupied cities of New Orleans, Memphis and Vicksburg were governed by officers who were frequently rotated from the field to CA/MG duties. They had no training in CA/MG affairs. The result was a government which alienated the local population and failed to stop commerce between these

occupied cities and the Southern Armies. In Cuba the lack of training in the local culture meant many reform activities were failures. For example, judicial reforms failed to take into account the local culture and the dislike of the population for passing judgements on their fellow citizen. These reforms were not successful until they were adapted to the local culture.

The initial planning and training efforts of the US Army just prior to World War II did try to avoid several of these early mistakes. The Provost Marshal proposed training CA/MG officers prior to the start of World War II. An Army Field Manual (FM 27-5) dealing with CA/MG procedures was published for the first time in 1940. The War Department proceeded with CA/MG planning prior to the occupation of any liberated or conquered territory.

The CA/MG planning efforts were hampered by the lack of well-defined procedures and organizational structures. CA/MG planning occurred simultaneously at the national level, the War Department level, and the theater level. This created much confusion and duplication of effort. Procedurally, the planning should have started at the national level where the objectives of the military occupation should be defined. The War Department could then develop the general policies needed to implement these objectives and define the resources needed and available.

With this information the theater commander could do the detailed planning, in conjunction with the host country for Civil Affairs, necessary to carry out the US policy. These procedures were absent in World War II and appear to be missing even today.

Organizationally the US could not decide who was ultimately responsible for CA/MG activities (the military or civilian organizations). Even the War Department did not have a Civil Affairs Division until 1943. Roosevelt did not place the US Army in charge of CA/MG until the end of 1943. Even then which organization was responsible for what changed from the time of the Mediterranean theater to the time of the European theater. Today it is still not entirely clear who will do what. The Army has Civil Affairs functions but so do civilian agencies such the Agency for International Development.

World War II was the first experience the US had in total war. Total war involved not just the surrender of the opposing military force but the total destruction of its war making capability. This policy of total war led to extensive damage to the civilian sector. CA/MG planners did not envision the amount of destruction nor the consequent amount of civilian supplies necessary to provide civilian relief and the rehabilitation of the local economy. Consequently, logistical planning for CA/MG grossly under

estimated supply requirements. Severe shortages occurred and the rehabilitation of local economies was delayed. Any CA/MG efforts today must recognize that logistical efforts are very costly and the time frame for results is long. If the US can not make the time and resource commitments necessary then future CA/MG activities will likely fail.

Research Question 2. What CA/MG logistics lessons were learned in the liberation of North Africa? Were these lessons applied during the rest of the war and during the post-war occupation of Germany?

The invasion of North Africa put the theory of civilian control of CA/MG to the test. The perceived results of this test affected how CA/MG matters were conducted for the rest of the war. The War Department felt the dual responsibility of civilians and the military for CA/MG did not work. The civilian organizations were not organized under a central authority and there was much duplication of effort. From this time in World War II the US Army would have sole responsibility for CA/MG. The Army was aided by many civilian agencies including the Red Cross and UNRRA. However, the Army was ultimately responsible.

Several valuable lessons were learned in civilian supplies, public health, economic and financial matters, public works, and labor in French North Africa. These lessons are reviewed below.

The single largest area of responsibility for CA/MG logistics in French North Africa was civilian supplies. Before the invasion it was recognized that civilian supplies were a necessary element to getting the local population on the Allies' side. The campaign in North Africa called for treating the French colonies as liberated territories. Civilian goods was seen as a way of gaining the cooperation of the local population. Throughout the campaign there was sufficient food available though the distribution of the food was a problem. The main lesson learned in civilian supplies in North Africa was the need for consumer and industrial goods.

Without consumer goods it was not easy to motivate the local population to work productively for the Allies. The lack of consumer goods in North Africa decreased the level of local help available to the Allies. The failure to import enough industrial goods was even more dramatic. French North Africa was a net exporter of food. The Allies wanted to exploit this capability by exporting food to Europe. However, the Allies would not devote the shipping resources necessary to bring agricultural equipment and supplies into North Africa. This meant increased food production was delayed and the Allies were forced to import foodstuffs from the US instead of North Africa. This used more shipping resources in long run.

The experience in North Africa also demonstrated the need for a single organization experienced in procuring supplies to handle civilian supplies. OLLA was not up to the task. The solution was to make the Quartermaster Corps responsible for civilian supplies.

Placing the Army in charge of civilian supplies demonstrated another lesson. Rehabilitation efforts cannot be ignored. The Army saw its civilian supplies effort as one of preventing disease and unrest. It did not see the benefits of rejuvenating the local economy. Consequently, it did not exploit host nation support as much as it could have. Today considerable emphasis is placed on host nation support in planning military operations. The question is: Will we provide the necessary industrial goods to rehabilitate war-torn economies when the time comes so we can use this host nation support? We did not learn this lesson for Germany at the start of the German occupation. Punitive measures inhibited the production of coal and steel because consumer goods were not available to act as incentives for the workers.

The experience in civilian supplies also pointed out the critical nature of transportation in CA/MB logistics efforts. The poor transportation infrastructure in North Africa meant considerable time and effort was spent in upgrading the transportation system and working distribution

problems. The lack of an organic transportation capability for CA/MB activities was particularly harmful. Combat troops did not have spare vehicles and the local economy could not be counted on to provide reliable vehicles. CA/MB efforts often floundered because of the lack of transportation. For example, food had to be imported to coastal cities because there was no way to bring food from the interior to the cities. CA/MB efforts in Italy, Europe, and post-war Germany all suffered tremendously because of the lack of transportation resources for CA/MB activities.

An important public health lesson learned in North Africa is the timely control of contagious diseases and the value of preventive measures. Malaria control measures were recognized as important but the malaria control units did not arrive before the start of the breeding season. Consequently, the control efforts were less effective than they could have been if the units had arrived earlier. Preventive disease efforts in Italy suffered from the lack of DDT powder. By the time of the occupation of Germany, the necessary supplies and manpower were available for preventive measures.

Besides the economic impacts of civilian supplies discussed above, French North Africa illustrated the need for currency planning. Poor currency planning in Sicily led to inflation and encouraged the black market. Similarly the

lack of currency reform in Germany delayed its recovery and encouraged black market operations.

Public works improvements are an essential element of CA/MG logistics. In French North Africa there were few public works so the infrastructure had to be developed. The efforts were successful thanks to the Army Corps of Engineers and the local population. But not enough priority was given for resources in this area. The result was the Allies frequently had to improvise. For example, in French North Africa we used ports closer to the battle front because the internal transportation network could not handle the traffic from better ports. Poor transportation for CA/MG activities plagued US efforts through World War II. The lack of shipping assets and the inability to clear ports of goods was also to plague all future CA/MG operations in World War II.

French North Africa also illustrated the value of local labor - not only as manual laborers but many of the railroad engineers and other technical personal came from the local population. Here the circle is closed. If civilian supplies are not adequate, it is hard to secure the help of the local population. Without this help, many combat groups are forced to perform service activities instead of fighting. Local labor was used extensively in all theaters

of CA/MG activities in World War II but the lack of consumer goods limited their effectiveness.

Research Question 3. What CA/MG logistics lessons were learned in the occupation of Italy? Were they applied during the post-war occupation of Germany?

CA/MG activities in Italy illustrate a number of lessons which can yield better CA/MG results in the future. The first lesson is the need for CA/MG officers assigned to tactical units to sell their services to the tactical commander and integrate themselves into the tactical organization. In Sicily, CA officers were often overlooked by the local commanders. In addition, CA officers spent valuable time establishing contacts within the tactical organization rather than performing their CA/MG duties. Had the CA/MG units been integrated with tactical units and had they trained together these problems would have been overcome prior to the invasion.

CA units were never integrated with tactical units in World War II. In fact, two distinct CA organizations evolved - one in support of tactical commander and the other to meet MG needs. Even today most CA units are reserve units and they are not integrated with the tactical units they will support (44:32).

Italy also illustrated the need for additional CA personnel, especially for clerical help and personnel to

perform security functions. This was also true in Germany. Many times artillery units had to be converted to security units because CA units did not have the manpower to meet their security requirements. A lot of looting, raping, and general lawlessness could have been prevented in Italy and Germany had more security forces been available to CA officers.

Food shortages were a problem for the first time in Sicily. As mentioned above the Allies did not do a good job planning for and providing foodstuffs. The result was Sicily, Italy, and the rest of Europe faced one food crisis after another. In all cases the actual requirements for food exceeded the planning estimates by a considerable amount.

CA/MB experience in Italy also demonstrated the value of restoring normal means of commerce and trade. At first the Allies tried to distribute supplies directly to the areas requiring them. This led to wide-spread losses. By putting the Italians in charge they put the responsibility on them to insure timely deliveries of supplies. Also distributing food through normal distribution channels helps to quickly revive local commerce.

Italy also illustrated the need to plan for restoration of public works, especially in war-torn areas. Initially, the work was done by the Corps of Engineers but their

primary role is to support tactical commanders. So they move on when the tactical forces move forward. Sicily illustrated the value of using local contractors to carry on with the restoration work. However, in areas where this capability is limited plans need to be developed to provide this capability from US resources even after tactical troops move forward. This was not done in World War II.

CA/MB experiences in Italy also illustrated the need for effective wage and price controls. Italy never had effective controls and the result was inflation and a thriving black market. This, in turn, led to an economy that largely avoided cash transactions. This undermined the tax revenues for government operations. German had similar problems with currency. The Reichsmark was worthless but there was no currency to replace it until 1948. Consequently, most transaction were either on the black market or through barter.

Italy also demonstrated the need to develop procedures in occupied areas to control the allocation of local resources between military uses and civilian uses. This was never effectively done in Italy. It was not a major problem in Germany, not because it was addressed, but because the US demobilized so fast after the war it was never an issue.

Research Question 4. What CA/MG logistics lessons were learned in the liberation of Europe? Were they applied during the post-war occupation of Germany?

The major new CA/MG logistics lesson learned in the liberation of Europe was the need to plan for the rehabilitation of local economies even as the war progresses. France, in particular, wanted some shipping set aside so it could import raw materials to get its economy back on its feet. The US generally ignored the rehabilitation of liberated Europe. These economies were devastated by war and exploited under Nazi Germany. They needed help to prime their economies again. This pump priming did not occur until late 1947 with the announcement of the Marshal Plan. Had economic aid been provided sooner a lot of suffering could have been avoided and the cost to the US might have been lower.

Research Question 5. What CA/MG logistics lessons were learned during the initial occupation of Germany (1945-1949)?

The major CA/MG logistics lesson learned from the World War II occupation of Germany is that CA/MG logistics is most effective as a tool for pursuing positive national objectives. At the start of the occupation, the objective was to restrain the German economy and prevent Germany from rising to dominance in Europe. The policy was effective,

too effective in a sense. Germany was in ruins. The lack of food and jobs made it ripe for communist overtures. A weak Germany also meant a weak Europe.

Once the US recognized the need for a strong Germany, CA/MG logistics measures (such as currency reform, increased production limits, import-export incentives, and improved communications and transportation systems) were put in place and helped create one of the greatest economic revivals the world has ever seen. Used constructively CA/MG logistics efforts can be an effective tool in developing and maintaining democratic nations like Germany and Japan.

Conclusions

In spite of an American tradition against the military exercise of civil power, military governments, or at least the performance of CA/MG functions by the US military, have existed in every major war since the War with Mexico. This thesis addressed the US logistics efforts under CA/MG during World War II and the post war occupation of Germany. Lessons learned from these logistics efforts were presented. It is recommended the lessons be applied to current CA/MG planning and training efforts.

Most of the CA/MG logistics lessons learned in the early operations of World War II were not transferred to later operations. This prevented CA/MG activities from providing all the benefits it can as a force multiplier to

the local commander. It also inhibited CA/MG activities in support of strategic objectives.

CA/MG can be an effective force multiplier (62:48-9). To make the best use of CA/MG efforts the lessons of the past must be applied to today's environment. Besides helping the tactical commander accomplish his operational mission, CA/MG is a vital element in achieving our national objectives. This strategic element of CA/MG should not be overlooked. Helping both friendly and belligerent nations recover from the ravages of war should be an integral part of our national objectives. CA/MG logistics plays an important role in this process. The US needs to better exploit this facet of military power in geographic areas of concern to the US.

Recommendations for Further Research

The following recommendations are made for future research:

1. Expand the analysis to include the Pacific Theater during World War II.
2. Expand the analysis to include the British, French, and Russia CA/MG experiences in World War II.
3. Expand the analysis to include liberated and occupied country's points of view.
4. Expand the analysis to cover US CA/MG experiences in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

5. Compare the lessons learned in CA/MG logistics from World War II and subsequent US military actions with current CA/MG training and planning efforts.

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Vita

Captain William L. Scott was born on 20 December 1951 in Tucson, Arizona. He graduated from Benjamin Franklin Senior High School in New Orleans, Louisiana in 1969. He attended the University of Southern California as a freshman, transferred to The University of Wisconsin at Madison as a sophomore, and then transferred to the University of Texas at Austin as a junior where he graduated with honors with a Bachelor of Science in Economics in 1974. Upon graduation, he entered Federal Civil Service as an Industry Economist at the Federal Communications Commission in Washington DC. He left the FCC in 1979 to become an associate of Walter Hinchman Associates, a communications consulting firm in Chevy Chase, Maryland. He left Walter Hinchman Associates in November 1983 to attend Officer Training School. In February 1984 he received a commission in the United States Air Force and served his first tour at Goodfellow Technical Training Center, Texas. There he was the Center Plans Officer responsible for all Goodfellow contingency plans until March 1986 when he was reassigned to Headquarters Third Air Force, RAF Mildenhall, England. There he served as Chief of the WRM and Mobility Branch in the Logistics Plans Division until entering the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology in May 1989.

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